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Abstract
EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the
control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429
on transmissible animal diseases (‘Animal Health Law’). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where
these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures
for peste des petits ruminants (PPR). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the
effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the
minimum radii of the protection and surveillance zones, and the minimum length of time the measures
should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been
published elsewhere; nonetheless, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radii
of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures
had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. The monitoring period
of 21 days was assessed as effective, except for the first affected establishments detected, where 33
days is recommended. It was concluded that beyond the protection (3 km) and the surveillance zones (10
km) only 9.6% (95% CI: 3.1–25.8%) and 2.3% (95% CI: 1–5.5%) of the infections from an affected
establishment may occur, respectively. This may be considered sufficient to contain the disease spread
(95% probability of containing transmission corresponds to 5.3 km). Recommendations provided for each
of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of
legislation, as well as for plausible ad-hoc requests in relation to PPR.
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Summary
This opinion is part of a series of opinions, in which the three first Terms of Reference (ToR) of a
mandate received from the European Commission have been considered. The background and specific
details of this mandate can be found in the opinion. The ToRs in this mandate request an assessment
of the effectiveness of:
• the clinical and laboratory examination in their capacity to detect disease (or estimate the
disease prevalence within an establishment), either in suspect or confirmed animals in a single
establishment, or in establishments within restriction zones (ToR 1);
• the effectiveness of the duration of the monitoring period (for different scenarios) in the control
of suspected and confirmed outbreaks (ToR 2);
• the size (ToR 3.1) and duration (ToR 3.2) of the restriction zones, in their capacity for mitigating
disease spread.
In order to harmonise the approach to these assessments, the methodology used in this series of
opinions, covering all Category A diseases, was agreed on, and published in a separate technical
report.
Specific clinical and laboratory procedures for peste des petits ruminants (PPR) for each scenario of
ToR 1 have been assessed. For assessing the effectiveness of detecting PPR in a herd, a model to
study the within herd transmission of PPR was designed. This allowed the calculation of infection and
seroprevalence at different points in time from PPR introduction in a herd, so to calculate the sample
size needed for early detection of suspected animals in an infected flock.
With a suspicion of PPR in an establishment, the purpose of the clinical examination based on
detection of clinical signs related to PPR, is to identify potentially infected animals in order to target
the sampling correctly. The confirmation of a clinical suspicion is based on laboratory testing, mainly by
confirming the presence of the virus nucleic acids (RT-PCR) or of antibodies (ELISA test).
To answer ToR 2, the assessment of the length of the monitoring period, and to assess the
minimum duration of measures to be implemented in the protection and surveillance zones (ToR 3.2),
an extensive literature search (ELS) was carried out. This ELS aimed to assess the average, shortest,
and longest period between the earliest point of infection of small ruminants with PPR virus (PPRV)
and the time of reporting of a suspicion by the competent authority. Twenty-one days as defined in the
Delegated Regulation is considered effective for all scenarios mentioned in ToR 2, except for the first
affected establishments detected in an area, where a monitoring period of 33 days is recommended.
Based on the assessment, the minimum period of 21 days indicated in the Delegated Regulation for
the restriction measures being in place in the protection zone is considered effective to detect infected
establishments and to prevent the movement of infected animals from the protection zone. The
minimum period of 30 days indicated in the Delegated Regulation for the restriction measures in the
surveillance zone should be extended up to 33 days, so to detect infected establishments and to
prevent the movement of infected animals from the surveillance zone.
To assess the effectiveness of the minimum radius to be implemented in the protection and
surveillance zones (ToR 3.1), transmission kernels were used. Because suitable transmission kernels
were not available for PPRV in EU situation, those for sheep and goat pox were used as a proxy. These
kernels were estimated using data on outbreaks of sheep pox and goat pox reported in the Evros
region of Greece from 2013 to 2014. The estimated probability of transmission beyond the protection
zone of 3 km radius (as indicated in the Delegated Regulation) from an infected establishment if
transmission occurred is 9.6% (95% CI: 3.1–25.8%) and 2.3% (95% CI: 1–5.5%) for 10 km radius
(surveillance zone), which may be considered sufficient to contain the disease spread. The 95%
probability of containing transmission would correspond to 5.3 km (CI: 1.8–10.6 km). If the aim is to
reduce the probability of transmission beyond the surveillance zone to 1%, the radius of this zone
should be increased from 10 km to 19 km (95% CI: 9.8–26.8). This, nonetheless, would on average
increase the number of farms in the surveillance zone (affected by movement restrictions) fourfold.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor
Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases (‘Animal Health Law’), hereinafter
referred to as AHL, requires the Commission to lay down detailed rules on the disease control
measures against listed diseases as referred to in point (a), (b) and (c) of its Article 9 (category A, B
and C diseases). The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts supplementing the rules laid
down in Part III of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases (Animal Health Law) on
disease control measures for listed diseases as referred to in point (a), (b) and (c) of its Article 9
(category A, B and C diseases). Therefore, the Commission has developed and adopted a Delegated
Regulation laying down rules for the prevention and control of certain diseases (‘the Delegated
Regulation’). The rules laid down in the Delegated Regulation are in respect of terrestrial animals
largely replicating the rules currently in force concerning the disease control measures in the event of
animal diseases with serious effects on the livestock as they have proven to be effective in preventing
the spread of those diseases within the Union. Consequently, many animal disease control measures
laid down in existing Directives will be, to the extent that not already done by the Animal Health Law,
replaced by the rules provided in the Delegated Regulation. At the same time, these rules have been
aligned with the international standards from the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE),
wherever these existed. However, certain disease control measures proposed in the Delegated
Regulation, in particular in its Annexes, were considered as outdated i.e. possibly not based on most
recent scientific evidence at the time of development. Their review is considered as necessary.
Moreover, for those category A diseases for which rules were not established before or were not
detailed enough, certain disease control and risk mitigating measures are, due to the lack of scientific
basis, extrapolated from other diseases, for which rules existed in the past. Finally, for some other
diseases the evidence and scientific knowledge, was not available to the Commission and to the
Member States at the time of developing the Delegated Regulation due to the time constraints. The
following diseases are examples of the later: infection with Rift Valley fever (RVF), infection with
Mycoplasma mycoides subsp. Mycoides SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia) (CBPP), Contagious
caprine pleuropneumonia (CCPP), Sheep pox and goat pox, infection with PPR, African horse sickness
(AHS), Glanders. In this regard, the existing rules will cease to apply as from the date of application of
the Animal Health Law and its complementing legislation including the Delegated Regulation, i.e. from
21 April 2021. Certain of the proposed measures for the prevention and control of category A diseases
of terrestrial animals should therefore be assessed in order to ensure that they are effective and
updated based on the latest scientific knowledge in this new set of legislation. This is particularly
important in the case of those diseases that are less common or have been never reported in the
Union.
1.1.1. ToR 1: sampling of animals and establishments for the detection of
category A diseases in terrestrial animals
Based on available scientific information, assess the effectiveness of existing sampling procedures
to detect or rule out the presence of each category A disease of terrestrial animals and, in case of
absence of effective procedures, develop them, in order to complete the rules provided for in Annex I
to the Delegated Regulation. In particular, provide for disease-specific procedures for the sampling of:
ToR 1.1 Animals for clinical examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant category A disease
during the performance of official investigations in establishments that are affected or suspected to be
affected by category A diseases and visits in establishments located in restricted zones in accordance
with Articles 6(2), 13(3)(c), 14(1) and 26(2) of the Delegated Regulation.
ToR 1.2 Animals for laboratory examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant category A
disease during the performance of official investigations in establishments that are affected or
suspected to be affected by category A diseases and visits in establishments located in restricted zones
in accordance with Articles 6(2), 12(3), 13(3)(c), 14(1), 26(2) of the Delegated Regulation.
ToR 1.3 Establishments to ensure the detection of the relevant category A disease for the
performance of visits in establishments located in protection zones larger than 3 km and
establishments located in the surveillance zone in accordance with Articles 26(5) and 41 of the
Delegated Regulation.
Control measures for PPR
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 6 EFSA Journal 2021;19(7):6708
ToR 1.4 Animals for clinical and laboratory examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant
category A disease for the movement of animals from restricted zones in accordance with Articles 28
(5), 43(5), 56(1)(c) of the Delegated Regulation.
ToR 1.5 Animals for laboratory examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant category A
disease before and after being introduced in the affected establishment for repopulation, in
accordance with Article 59(2), (3) and (9) of the Delegated Regulation.
1.1.2. ToR 2: monitoring period
ToR 2.1 Assess the effectiveness of the length of the monitoring periods set out in Annex II of the
Delegated Regulation for each category A disease of terrestrial animals. In this regard, it is important
to take into consideration that the monitoring period was introduced as a management tool, which
represents a time frame of reference assigned to each category A disease for the competent authority
to apply certain control measures and to carry out investigations in the event of suspicion and
confirmation of category A diseases in terrestrial animals.
This assessment should be carried out with respect to the following situations:
a) the records analysis carried out by the competent authority in the framework of the
epidemiological enquiry referred to in Article 57 of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, in the event of
suspicion of a category A disease (Article 8(4) of the Delegated Regulation);
b) the derogation from killing in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease in
establishments keeping animals of listed species in two or more epidemiological units (Article
13(1) of the Delegated Regulation);
c) the tracing carried out by the competent authority to identify establishments and other
locations epidemiologically linked to an establishment affected by a category A disease
(Article 17(2) of the Delegated Regulation);
d) the exemption applied to certain products from the prohibitions laid down in Annex VI taking
into account the date they were produced (Article 27(3)(c) of the Delegated Regulation);
e) the specific conditions for authorising movements of semen from approved germinal product
establishments in the protection and surveillance zones (Article 32(c) and 48(c) of the
Delegated Regulation);
f) the repopulation of establishments affected by a category A disease (Article 57(1)(b) and
59(4)(b) of the Delegated Regulation).
ToR 2.2 Propose the length of what should be the monitoring period in those diseases for which
the time is assessed as not effective.
1.1.3. ToR 3: minimum radius of restricted zones and duration of the disease
control measures in restricted zones
ToR 3.1 Assess the effectiveness to control the spread of the disease of the minimum radius of the
protection and surveillance zones set out in Annex V of the Delegated Regulation for each category A
disease of terrestrial animals.
ToR 3.2 Assess the effectiveness to control the spread of the disease of the minimum periods
during which the competent authority should apply the restriction measures in the protection and
surveillance zones as set out in Annex X and XI for each category A disease of terrestrial animals.
1.1.4. ToR 4: prohibitions in restricted zones and risk-mitigating treatments for
products of animal origin and other materials
ToR 4.1 Assess the effectiveness to control the spread of disease of prohibitions set out in Annex VI
of the Delegated Regulation with respect to the risk associated for each category A disease, to the
listed activities and commodities.
ToR 4.2 Review the available scientific information on risk-mitigating treatments that are effective to
control the presence of category A disease agents in products of animal origin and other relevant
materials. Based on this:
a) provide an opinion on the effectiveness of the risk-mitigating treatments for products of
animal origin and other materials produced or processed in the restricted zone set out in
Annex VII and VIII, and
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b) if relevant, suggest new treatments or procedures that can be effective to mitigate or to
eliminate such risk.
1.2. Interpretation of the Terms of Reference
To address the ToRs of the mandate, EFSA proposed and agreed with the European Commission
the following:
a) The publication of 14 individual opinions, one for each of the diseases included in the list of
category A diseases for terrestrial animals, with each of these opinions providing the answer
to ToRs 1, 2 and 3. The current manuscript is one of the 14 opinions covering ToRs 1, 2 and
3 for PPR.
b) The publication of a unique opinion covering ToR 4 for all diseases listed (i.e. ToR 4 is not
covered in this opinion).
c) To address ToR 1 (effectiveness of sampling procedures), EFSA agreed with the European
Commission on 21 scenarios (based on different articles of the Delegated Regulation1) for
which the effectiveness of the sampling procedures will be assessed (Annexes B and C).
Although these scenarios will be assessed independently, some of these scenarios may be
merged if the assessment processes are the same.
d) To address ToR 2 (effectiveness of the monitoring period), seven scenarios previously agreed
with the contractor were defined (Annex D). The assessment of the effectiveness of the
monitoring period will be done by assessing its ability to ensure that specific actions can be
carried out without posing a risk of disease spread, if the monitoring period is calculated
backwards or forwards from a specific date (e.g. a 15-day monitoring period would be
considered effective if all the epidemiological links of an affected establishment can be traced
by an inspection of the establishment records that go 15 days back from the date of the
disease confirmation). If the length of the monitoring period estimated by EFSA is longer
than the existing monitoring period, the existing monitoring period will be considered non-
effective. If the length of the monitoring period estimated by EFSA is shorter than the
existing monitoring period, this existing monitoring period will be considered effective from a
disease control point of view. No assessment of the plausible unnecessary economic burden
that may be placed on the stakeholders as a result of an excessive length of the monitoring
periods will be done by EFSA.
e) The assessment of the minimum duration and the length of the radii of the protection and
surveillance zones (ToR 3) will be done independently. The setting of these two zones
(protection and surveillance zones) surrounding an affected establishment and the control
measures implemented in each one of the zones are based on the general principle that the
probability of disease spread is higher the closer an establishment is to an affected
establishment. The validity of this statement will not be assessed in this manuscript;
nonetheless the limitations that this assumption may have in the control of certain diseases
will, when relevant, be discussed.
f) The following scenarios of the ToR 1 of the Annex B are not relevant for PPR, and therefore
not included in the assessment of the current Opinion:
i) scenarios 10, 11, 16 and 17 because they are referring to poultry.
g) The duration of the monitoring period for PPR as described in Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation is 21 days.
h) The minimum radii of the protection zone (PZ) and surveillance zone (SZ) for PPR as
described in Annex V of the Delegated regulation are 3 and 10 km, respectively.
i) The minimum duration of the measures in the PZ and SZ for PPR as described in Annex X and
XI of the Delegated Regulation are 21 and 30 days, respectively.
1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020R0687&from=EN
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2. Disease characterisation and geographical distribution of PPR
2.1. Aetiology
PPR is a highly contagious viral disease affecting mostly sheep and goats, but also some other wild
species within the order Artiodactyla (see Section 2.2). The causative agent is the PPR virus (PPRV),
an enveloped RNA virus with a mono-segmented genome of negative sense, and the species name:
Small ruminant morbillivirus (Amarasinghe et al., 2019). It belongs to the family Paramyxoviridae,
genus Morbillivirus, which also includes rinderpest, canine distemper and measles viruses. A single
serotype is present, but the various strains are grouped into four genetic lineages (lineages I–IV)
based on molecular characterisation using a partial sequence of the N gene, with lineages I and II
occurring in West Africa, lineage III in East Africa, the Middle East and southern India, and lineage IV
in Asia (Kwiatek et al., 2007; Charbonnier et al., 2015; EFSA AHAW Panel, 2015; Dundon et al., 2020).
The different lineages and strains may have also different virulence.
2.2. Epidemiology
PPRV infects mostly sheep and goats, with goats being more susceptible than sheep, and in
particular dwarf goat species from West Africa (Diop et al., 2005; EFSA AHAW Panel, 2015). PPRV is
not considered pathogenic in cattle or wild African buffaloes (Syncerus caffer), which develop a solid
immune response, but high case fatality rates (96%) have been reported in domestic water buffaloes
(Bubalus bubalis) in India (Govindarajan et al., 1997; CFSPH, 2015). PPRV was detected in camelids
exhibiting respiratory signs, but recent publications suggest they are dead-ends hosts (CFSPH, 2015;
Charbonnier et al., 2015; EFSA AHAW Panel, 2015; Schulz et al., 2019). Like cattle, pigs are
considered a dead-end host. However, experimental infections of domestic pigs with PPRV have shown
that pigs may transmit the virus to in-contact pigs and goats (Schulz et al., 2019). Viral excretion of
infected pigs and wild boars suggest that suids should be considered as a possible source of infection
(Charbonnier et al., 2015; Schulz et al., 2018).
A large number of species within the order Artiodactyla, both wild and captive, are susceptible to
PPRV. Spill-over infections from domestic populations have been reported, with clinical disease in
several species of gazelles and antelopes and other wild ruminants such as wild goats and wild sheep
species, though the epidemiological role of wildlife as a potential reservoir is unknown (CFSPH, 2015;
EFSA AHAW Panel, 2015). Natural infections in free-ranging wildlife leading to mass die-offs, such as
for the Sa€ıga antelope (Saiga tatarica), highlight the threat of PPR to endangered wild species (Pruvot
et al., 2020).
The impact of PPR on other endangered wild artiodactyl populations remains unknown (Aguilar
et al., 2018). In endemic regions, wildlife does not appear to maintain PPRV infection (Mahapatra
et al., 2015). However, due to our still incomplete understanding of PPR in wildlife and considering that
wildlife may act as bridge hosts (Caron et al., 2015), the role of wildlife in PPR epidemiology and
control cannot be ignored (Wohlsein and Singh, 2015; Fine et al., 2020).
PPRV is transmitted mainly by direct contact with discharges from infected animals. In these
animals, the virus is present in excretions and secretions, ocular and nasal discharges, urine, milk and
faeces. Infection occurs after breathing viral aerosols but also indirectly after ingestion of material from
contaminated fomites (such as water troughs, feed troughs, and bedding) though the virus does not
persist more than a few days in the environment especially in hot regions (Charbonnier et al., 2015).
The severity of the disease depends on the immune status of the animals and will be more
pronounced in na€ıve populations or in young animals at weaning, when they are no longer protected
by colostral antibodies (Charbonnier et al., 2015).
The disease was first described in 1942 in West Africa, and has progressively spread to East and
Northern Africa and is now endemic in most African countries (except the southern extreme of the
continent), the Near and Middle East, several Asian countries (extending from West Asia to China) and
has more recently reached Turkey, and Europe (Georgia and Bulgaria) (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2015; OIE,
2019a). This rapid expansion now threatens more than 80% of the sheep and goat population
throughout the world. Factors that have contributed to the spread of PPR include: an increase in
livestock movements across countries and regions for commercial and trade purposes (e.g. the
massive imports of small ruminants into the Middle East); transhumance and nomadic customs; and
extensive farming practices, especially if occurring during breakdown of veterinary services, e.g. in
Control measures for PPR
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 9 EFSA Journal 2021;19(7):6708
areas or periods of socio-political instability (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2015). Movements of infected animals
through illegal trade are the major route of introduction of the disease into non-endemic areas.
PPR is the fastest growing and potentially the most economically important disease affecting small
ruminants. For this reason, a PPR global control and eradication programme and strategy was
launched by FAO and OIE in 2015 with the goal of eradicating the disease by 2030, following a four-
stage stepwise approach, depending on the epidemiological situation in endemic countries (FAO,
2016). In case of incursion of PPR into free countries, strict control of animal movements and
quarantine are necessary; slaughter of infected and exposed animals with a possible use of ring-
vaccination is needed. In endemic countries, vaccination with a live-attenuated vaccine is effective,
providing long-term (at least 3 years, possibly life-long) immunity, and serological monitoring is used
to estimate the disease seroprevalence and/or vaccination coverage (OIE, 2020).
2.3. Clinical Signs and Diagnosis
The incubation period is typically 4–6 days (range 3–10 days). In a review of experimental
infections, the median incubation period was 4 days and the minimum was 1 day in goats and 3 days
in sheep (Dorea et al., 2021). The severity of the disease depends on the PPRV strain, host species,
breed, health status, immune status.
Goats are generally more severely affected than sheep. The morbidity in a susceptible population
can reach 90–100% and the case fatality up to 50–100% (OIE, 2020). In endemic areas these rates
can be much lower for both morbidity and mortality (10–20%) and the disease usually occurs with
seasonal outbreaks affecting mostly young non-immune animals aged 4–24 months (CFSPH, 2015).
In the acute form, the most common, infected animals develop a sudden and high fever (40–41°C),
which can last 3–5 days, anorexia, depression, dry muzzle, conjunctivitis followed by serous nasal and
ocular discharge becoming later on mucopurulent with the presence of crusts around the nostrils,
which can become obstructed. Within a few days, gums become hyperaemic and erosions and necrosis
appear in the mouth (gums, dental pad, lips, tongue) causing pain and hypersalivation and a typical
foul smell. Similar lesions are also seen on the vulva and vagina in females. Later on, a profuse and
watery diarrhoea, sometimes bloody, will appear causing dehydration and weakness. Associated
bronchopneumonia with dyspnoea and cough is common and often complicated by bacterial infections
(pasteurellosis). Death occurs within 5–10 days after the onset of the symptoms and surviving animals
recover after 1–2 weeks. Abortion of pregnant animals is frequent. In the peracute form, with general
signs of major infections and mostly observed in na€ıve young animals, the course of the disease is
shorter and more severe and the animal progresses to sudden death (100% case fatality in 5–6 days),
while in the subacute form, fever and other symptoms are less pronounced, sometimes limited to
ocular and nasal discharge. Asymptomatic form can be observed in endemic areas, especially in sheep
(FAO, 1999; Diallo, 2003; CFSPH, 2015; Charbonnier et al., 2015; EFSA AHAW Panel, 2015; OIE,
2020).
The virus shedding goes on for a long period from the beginning of the incubation period to the
end of the diarrhoea phase. Detection of PPRV during this period can be made from swabs of ocular
and nasal discharge or from unclotted blood samples. It is routinely performed with antigen capture
enzyme linked immunosorbent assays (ELISAs), reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR), real-time RT-PCR or reverse transcription-loop mediated isothermal amplification technique (RT-
LAMP), the latter being able to perform the test within 1 h in the field. Real-time RT-PCR assays have
100% sensitivity in sheep and goats, according to a literature review done by EFSA (Dorea et al.,
2021) and presented in Table I.1 in Annex I. Other antigen detection tests are commercial lateral flow
device (LFD), counter-immuno-electrophoresis and agar gel diffusion (AGID), the latter being less
sensitive. Virus isolation is performed for genetic characterisation of the PPRV strain (OIE, 2019a,
2020).
Animals recovering from PPRV infection are protected for life against any other PPRV infections,
whatever the lineage involved. Competitive antibody ELISA (c-ELISA) for antibody detection is the
method of choice, as it is well adapted to large-scale studies. C-ELISA shows a high degree of
correlation to the virus neutralisation test (VNT), the gold standard assay (Se: 100%, see Annex I)
that, nevertheless, is laborious and requires 7–14 days for completion. The average sensitivity of the
c-ELISA applied to cattle, sheep and goats, is 94.5% according to the average value from a recent
literature review (Dorea et al., 2021) and presented in Table I.1 in Annex I. Currently, these tests
cannot differentiate infected from vaccinated animals. Antibody ELISAs are used either for
seroprevalence studies or estimation of vaccination coverage (Charbonnier et al., 2015; OIE, 2019a).
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PPR can be easily confused with other diseases with similar respiratory signs such as bluetongue,
contagious caprine pleuropneumonia (CCPP) and pasteurellosis, a secondary complication of PPR.
2.4. Geographical distribution of PPR
PPR is present mainly in Africa and Asia. In Figure 1, the number of years with reported outbreaks
of PPR between 2004 and 2020 is shown, while in Figure 2 the countries with the OIE official free
status for PPR are displayed.
Figure 1: Map of countries with number of years of reported outbreaks of PPR in small ruminants
between 2004 and 2020 (Data sources: ADNS and OIE)
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2.5. Vaccination
Vaccination is the most important and effective control tool against PPR and the OIE together with
the FAO developed the Global Control and Eradication Strategy of PPR under the Global Framework for
the progressive control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs). The strategy is based on a
stepwise approach to control the disease through extensive vaccination campaigns, with the ultimate
goal of the global eradication of PPR by 2030. So far only live attenuated vaccines are available, with
high safety and efficacy, and protecting against all known strains of PPRV (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2015).
No PPR vaccines are licensed in the EU. The most common vaccine strain, Nigeria 75/1, has been used
extensively in Africa and the Middle East to suppress outbreaks (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2015). The
available PPR vaccines do not support the Differentiating Infected from Vaccinated Animals (DIVA)
principle. Possible DIVA vaccines based on recombinant techniques are promising but are still at the
experimental stage. Inactivated vaccines are not available and, owing to the immunological response
to PPRV, would not be fully effective. The lessons learned from the PPR epidemics show that PPR can
be controlled in areas, such as Northern Africa, through mass vaccination campaigns implemented at
the national level, provided that adequate means are available and correctly implemented (EFSA AHAW
Panel, 2015).
3. Data and methodologies
3.1. Methodology used in ToR 1
Although the general methodology applied to all opinions covering the assessment of control
measures for the Category A diseases produced under this mandate has been published elsewhere
(EFSA, 2020), specific details of the methodology related to the PPR opinion are presented below.
3.1.1. Mathematical model for within-herd dynamics of PPR and transmission
scenarios considered
3.1.1.1. Model description
The within-herd dynamics of PPRV in small ruminants were modelled using a stochastic SEIR
epidemic model (Keeling and Rohani, 2011). The small ruminant population was divided into four
classes: susceptible (i.e. uninfected), S; exposed (i.e. infected, but not yet infectious), E; infectious, I;
and recovered, R. No distinction was made between sheep and goats.
Figure 2: Map of countries with the OIE official free status for PPR, 2020 (Source: OIE; © OIE)
Control measures for PPR
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 12 EFSA Journal 2021;19(7):6708
The force of infection is given by,
cðtÞ ¼ b I(t)
N(t)
;
where b is the transmission rate, I(t) is the number of infectious animals at time t and N(t) is the total
number of animals at time t. This formulation assumes homogeneous mixing (i.e. individuals uniformly
and randomly contact each other) and frequency-dependent transmission (i.e. the number of contacts
is independent of the population size) (Keeling and Rohani, 2011). The durations of the latent and
infectious periods were assumed to follow gamma distributions with means lE and lI and shape




I/kI). This was incorporated in the
model by subdividing the latent and infectious classes into kE and kI stages each of mean duration lE/
kE and lI/kI, respectively (Anderson and Watson, 1980). Disease-associated mortality was assumed to
occur at a constant rate during the infectious period.
The number of animals in each class takes an integer value, while transitions between classes are
stochastic processes. The number of transitions of each type during a small time interval dt was drawn
from a binomial distribution with number of animals in the class, n, and transition probability, q, (the
appropriate per capita rate multiplied by dt) as parameters.
The initial herd size was assumed to be 50, 100, 500 or 1,000 small ruminants. Transmission rates
and mortality were extracted from published analyses of outbreaks (Zahur et al., 2009; Kivaria et al.,
2013; Fournie et al., 2018). From these, two scenarios were identified for the transmission rate (low
and high) and two for mortality (low and high) (Table 1). Accordingly, four scenarios were considered
in total (Figure 3). Latent and infectious periods were estimated from challenge experiments (Couacy-
Hymann et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2013; Wernike et al., 2014; Parida et al., 2019; Halecker et al., 2020)
and were the same in all scenarios (latent period: mean, lE = 4 days; shape, kE = 10; infectious
period: mean, lE = 21 days; shape, kE = 10).








Low mortality Low transmission 4.2 0.23 20
High transmission 6.8 0.37 20
High mortality Low transmission 4.2 0.32 60
High transmission 6.8 0.52 60
†: The transmission rate was calculated so that R0 was the same in the two case fatality scenarios (20% and 60%).
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3.1.1.2. Detection of PPR virus
Sampling sick or dead sheep and goats
Only infectious animals were assumed to show clinical signs of PPR. The proportion of animals
showing clinical signs was assumed to be 40% in the low mortality scenarios and 80% in the high
mortality scenarios (cf. Kivaria et al., 2013). The number of animals showing clinical signs each day
was drawn from a binomial distribution with number of trials given by the number of infectious animals
and the probability of success given by the proportion of animals showing clinical signs. The number of
sheep or goats dying of PPR is a direct output of the model.
The time to five sheep or goats showing clinical signs of PPR and dying of PPR in each scenario is
shown in Tables K.1 and K.2 in Annex K, respectively.
Sampling asymptomatic sheep and goats
The prevalence of virus-positive sheep and goats was assumed to correspond to the prevalence of
infectious animals. Based on a time to seroconversion (i.e. time between infection and when
antibodies are first detectable) of around 8 days (see Section 4.2.1.2 and other studies (Wernike et al.,
2014; Liu et al. 2013; Halecker et al., 2020), which is also in line with what is presented in
Section 4.2.1.2) 97% of infectious animals and all recovered animals were assumed to be seropositive.
The prevalence is the proportion of sheep and goats either infected or seropositive, with the
denominator in the calculations being the initial herd size minus the cumulative number of animals that
have died of PPRV.
The time to reach 5% and 10% infection and seroprevalence in herds containing 50, 100, 500, or
1,000 animals, respectively, is calculated and displayed in Tables K.3–K.6 in Annex K, respectively.
The plots show the median (solid black line) and 95% prediction interval (coloured shading) for the number of
exposed animals (first column; magenta), infectious animals (second column; red), recovered animals (third
column; blue) and cumulative number of dead animals (fourth column; cyan) for four scenarios which differ in
transmission rate and mortality (rows; see Table 1 for details).
Figure 3: Results of a simulation model showing within-herd dynamics of PPRV in a herd of 100 small
ruminants
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The infection prevalence and seroprevalence of PPR reached at 7, 14, 21, 28 days post-introduction
is displayed in Tables K.7–K.14 in Annex K, respectively. This is useful to calculate the sample size
needed for detection of suspected animals in an infected flock (see Section 4.1.1.1).
3.2. Methodology used in ToR 2
3.2.1. Time lag between infection and reporting
To estimate the time lag between infection and reporting of a PPR suspicion (ToR 2), an extensive
literature search (ELS) was outsourced by EFSA (OC/EFSA/ALPHA/2020/02 – LOT 2). The aim of this
ELS was to answer the epidemiological question of: ‘what is the average, shortest and longest period
of time for an outbreak of PPR to be reported (measured as the number of days from the earliest
point of infection with PPR, to the time of declaration of a suspicion by the competent authority after
the clinical investigation by an official veterinarian)?’. To answer this question, an ELS on case reports,
papers describing outbreaks or epidemics of PPR, and any other relevant grey literature or data was
carried out (details are provided in Annex J). For inclusion in the ELS, the earliest point of infection
had to be estimated by carrying out an epidemiological investigation. Papers and other sources of
data, where the earliest point of infection was determined purely by subtracting a known incubation
period from the date of the suspicion of the outbreak, were excluded. The ELS was initially restricted
to studies conducted in Europe or describing results obtained in Europe, although, because of the
small number of references retrieved for European countries (n = 2), the selection was extended to
the rest of the world. If fewer than six articles were retrieved in the first search, the search was
extended to the rest of the world. A ELS protocol similar to that shown in Annex 5 of the Methodology
report (EFSA, 2020) was followed.
3.2.2. Seroconversion period
Considering scenario 5 of the 2nd ToR, ‘the earliest day of the seroconversion after the infection,
detected by different serological methods in different animal species is necessary to be identified for
each disease of concern. In addition, the time interval between the earliest day of antibodies detection
and the latest day of antibodies detection by different laboratory methods would be useful’, a scientific
literature review on the earliest day of seroconversion and the latest day of antibody detection after
PPR infection and the relevant target population (listed species) of the disease, was conducted to
successfully address this scenario.
The objectives of the literature review were to identify:
i) the earliest day/or range of days of seroconversion (earliest day when antibodies have been
detected) after infection/inoculation for each serological test used, for different animals’
species,
ii) the duration of serological positivity after infection/inoculation for each serological test used,
per each animal species,
iii) the target population (listed species) for the diseases.
The methodology used to perform the literature search is described in Annex G.
3.3. Methodology used in ToR 3
3.3.1. Methodology for assessing the effectiveness of the minimum radius of the
protection and surveillance zones
The assessment of radius size of restricted zones (ToR 3), to prevent further disease spread at a
given probability, was performed by using disease transmission kernels (EFSA, 2020) and presented in
Section 4.3. Details about the methodology are shown in Annex H.
3.3.2. Methodology for assessing the effectiveness of the duration of the
protection and surveillance zones
To estimate the duration of measures in the protection and surveillance zones, the outputs
obtained from the ELS described in Section 3.2 were used. Further details can be found in the
Methodology report (EFSA, 2020).
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3.4. Uncertainty
A description of the methodology used to deal with uncertainty is provided in a Methodology report
published by EFSA (EFSA, 2020).
4. Assessment
4.1. Assessment of sampling procedures (ToR 1)
4.1.1. Assessment of sampling procedures in the event of suspicion or
confirmation of PPR
4.1.1.1. In the event of a suspicion of PPR in an establishment where animals of the
listed species are kept
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures of
animals of listed species in a suspected establishment, based on clinical examination (ToR 1.1) and
laboratory examination (ToR 1.2), in their ability to detect PPRV infection in kept animals if the disease
is present in that establishment, or to rule it out if not present (Art. 6 (2)). For further details, see
Annexes B and C.
Summary of sampling procedures
No specific guidelines on sampling procedures for clinical or laboratory examination in the event of
a suspicion of PPR are available in the EU legislation.
Guidelines for sampling procedures in case of PPR suspicion are reported in other available
documents, particularly in relation to the number of samples to be taken from clinically affected or
dead animals.
The manual by ILRI (Wieland et al., 2020) suggests to collect samples from 1 to 5 animals for the
PPRV rapid diagnostic test. In case of recently dead sheep or goats (within 24 h), then a post-mortem
examination is recommended with the collection of tissue samples collected for laboratory submission.
The field guide by the Department of Agriculture and CSIRO (2019), suggests to collect serum,
from at least 10 animals (if possible) towards the end of the acute phase or from recovered animals,
and EDTA blood, from live, clinically affected animals (7–10 mL/animal) during the acute phase
(preferably from pyretic animals).
The Manual for samples collection in case of PPR by the SADC PPR working group (SADC PPR WG,
2013) suggests a more structured procedure for sample collection, including a random sample of
clinically healthy animals, stratified according to the age, and to sample at least 4 animals with lesions
or clinical signs compatible with PPR.
• 1st Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.1 and ToR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 6(2) of the Delegated Regulation
• Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882 on listed species
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns an event of suspicion of PPR in an establishment with kept animals of the listed species;
2) The listed species for PPR as provided in Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882 are those
belonging to the species Ovis and Capra ssp., and the families Camelidae, and Cervidae;
3) Subsequent to the suspicion, the competent authority shall immediately conduct an investigation to
confirm or rule out the presence of the disease;
4) The official veterinarian must perform a clinical examination and collect samples for further laboratory
examination (see Annex C for details on guidelines on how the clinical and laboratory examination
must be carried out).
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Assessment
In the scenario of a suspicion of PPR in an establishment, the purpose of the clinical examination2
based on detection of clinical signs such as fever, diarrhoea, respiratory signs (including both the initial
visual inspection of the herd and the individual examination of the animals), is to identify potentially
infected animals in order to target the sampling correctly.
The confirmation of clinical suspicion is based on laboratory test, mainly by confirming the presence
of the virus nucleic acids (RT-PCR) or of antibodies (ELISA test).
The collection of samples for RT-PCR testing can be performed either on dead or alive animals. In
the latter, samples should be collected in the acute phase of the disease, when clinical signs are
apparent, to maximise the probability of detecting the viral genome. The recommended samples from
live animals are swabs of conjunctival discharges, nasal secretions, buccal and rectal mucosae, and
anticoagulant-treated blood.
In dead or euthanised animals, the best samples for RT-PCR examination are mediastinal and
mesenteric lymph nodes, lungs and spleen. Considering the rapid inactivation of the virus after the
death of the animal, samples must be collected few hours after the death. Therefore, in field
conditions, samples from sick but live animals are preferred. All samples must be refrigerated and
quickly dispatched to the laboratory, within 24 h (CIRAD, 2019).
Detection of antibodies for PPR confirmation in a PPR-free country, with no vaccinated animals, can
complement the RT-PCR testing, taking into account that only from 10 to 14 days after the infection
the antibodies are detectable by ELISA assays. The confirmation based on serology alone requires the
collection of two blood samples, 3 weeks apart, from the same animals, which is not always feasible in
the field. Serological surveys are useful to determine the presence or absence of infection in a defined
country or zone and its extent in a population.
Development of new procedures
In Figure 4, a schematic decision tree showing the diagnostic procedure for PPR confirmation is
reported.
Figure 4: Decision tree of the diagnostic procedure for PPR confirmation
2 Definition of the term ‘clinical examination’ is provided in the article 3 of the Delegated Regulation: the clinical examination
comprises: (i) an initial general evaluation of the animal health status of the establishment which comprises all the animals of
listed species kept in the establishment; and (ii) an individual examination of the animals included in the sample referred to in
point (a). The sampling of animals for clinical examination is carried out in accordance with point A.1 of Annex I for terrestrial
animals.
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For sampling purposes, in case of clinical signs being present, even generic signs such as fever,
lethargy, lost appetite, nasal/oral discharge and/or changes in the individual animal behaviour and/or
in the feed intake, animals should be targeted and PCR should be the test of choice, since animals
with clinical signs of PPR are expected to be viraemic. Post-mortem examination will be carried out on
euthanised or recently dead susceptible animals for the collection of organs and tissues on which
virological tests will be performed.
In case of sick animals, therefore, these should be the preferred targets for sample collection. Ideally,
all euthanised and sick animals should be sampled, to maximise the probability of detecting the virus or
its genome. However, in case of large numbers of animals showing clinical signs, those showing fever and
other signs typical of the acute phase of the disease should be preferred. The cachectic or pre-agonic
animals, in the final stages of the disease, are not the best option for PPRV detection.
It must be considered that, according to the model simulation as displayed in Table 2, in a period
between 13 and 27 days after disease introduction (d.p.in., depending on the herd size) at least five
animals are expected to be clinically affected. Given this, considering the high sensitivity of RT-PCR
(100%, see Section 2.3 and Annex I), the probability of not detecting the infection after testing five
affected animals is almost nil.
If clinical signs are not evident in the herd, the sampling of randomly selected asymptomatic
animals can be performed.
Given the variability of PPR spread and mortality, the sample size (based on random sampling)
needed is based on the median values of infection and serological prevalence predicted in four
scenarios as presented in Section 3.1.1, combining low and high transmission (R0 = 4.2 and 6.8,
respectively) and low and high case fatality (20% and 60%), at different point in time after
introduction of the virus into the herd and for different herd sizes, i.e. 50, 100, 500 and 1,000 animals,
respectively (Tables 2 and 3). The mortality is considered occurring continuously during the whole
outbreak period, not only in the end of infectious period.
If clinical signs are absent (suspicion because of contact, import, etc.), then ELISA should be also
performed (sensitivity and specificity of c-ELISA is 94.5% and 98.6%, respectively, with Se ranging
from 93.4% to 96.7% and Sp ranging from 98.1% to 99.2%), based on literature review, Dorea et al.,
2021), since the exact time of exposure is unknown, and the animals may have a high level of
antibodies. In the case of serology, however, the scenarios for calculation of sample size needed to
reveal positive animals should not consider the 7 d.p.in. (Table 2), since at that point in time
detectable levels of antibodies cannot be found in infected animals yet.
Table 2: Sample size for random sampling to detect PPR infection with 95% confidence based on
different values of infection prevalence (median values, as from Tables 8–11) at 7, 14, 21
and 28 days after PPRV introduction into the herd for testing by PCR (Se and Sp: 100%,
Annex I) for four different scenarios of transmission and mortality and of herd size
Scenario: sample size at 7 d.p.in. into the herd
(median value) for PCR testing
Herd size
50 100 500 1,000
Low transmission, low mortality 48 96 476 951
High transmission, low mortality 39 78 388 777
Low transmission, high mortality 48 96 476 951
High transmission, high mortality 39 78 388 777
14 d.p.in.
Low transmission, low mortality 32 63 316 632
High transmission, low mortality 22 39 196 393
Low transmission, high mortality 26 53 264 632
High transmission, high mortality 17 39 174 393
21 d.p.in.
Low transmission, low mortality 17 35 196 312
High transmission, low mortality 9 17 76 145
Low transmission, high mortality 15 31 156 283
High transmission, high mortality 7 12 52 92
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4.1.1.2. For the purposes of the epidemiological enquiry as referred to Article 57 of
Regulation (EU)2016/429 in an establishment affected and officially confirmed
with PPR
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures,
based on laboratory examination (ToR 1.2), in their ability to detect the disease in the event of preventive
killing, and in their ability to support the epidemiological investigation (disease detection, prevalence
estimation, virus identification, etc.) in kept animals of listed species in an affected establishment, before
or when they are killed or found dead. The purposes of the epidemiological enquiry are described in
Article 57 of Regulation (EU)2016/429. For further details, see Annexes B and C.
Scenario: sample size at 7 d.p.in. into the herd
(median value) for PCR testing
Herd size
50 100 500 1,000
28 d.p.in.
Low transmission, low mortality 11 19 90 170
High transmission, low mortality 5 6 27 47
Low transmission, high mortality 9 15 69 122
High transmission, high mortality 4 5 16 25
Table 3: Sample size for random sampling to detect PPR serological positivity with 95% confidence
based on different values of seroprevalence (median values, as from Table 13–15 at 14, 21
and 28 days after PPRV introduction into the herd for testing by ELISA (Se: 94.5%, Sp:
98.6%), for four different scenarios of transmission and mortality and of herd size
Herd size
50 100 500 1,000
14 d.p.in.
Low transmission, low mortality 33 67 334 668
High transmission, low mortality 24 42 208 416
Low transmission, high mortality 28 56 279 668
High transmission, high mortality 18 41 184 330
21 d.p.in.
Low transmission, low mortality 18 33 184 330
High transmission, low mortality 9 17 77 154
Low transmission, high mortality 18 30 165 299
High transmission, high mortality 7 13 57 97
28 d.p.in.
Low transmission, low mortality 10 18 85 171
High transmission, low mortality 4 7 28 49
Low transmission, high mortality 9 15 70 124
High transmission, high mortality 4 5 17 27
• 2nd Scenario of sampling procedures.
• ToR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate.
• Article 12(3) and the Art. 7 (4) (Preventive killing) of the Delegated Regulation.
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429.
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns an affected establishment officially confirmed;
2) Kept animals of listed species found dead or before/when they are killed are sampled;
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Summary of sampling procedures
There are no sampling procedures defined for the purposes of the epidemiological enquiry in an
establishment affected and officially confirmed with PPR.
Assessment
Length of infection
For PPR, it is not possible to derive or estimate the length of infection (the time of exposure) by the
lesions, which are not disease-specific and may greatly vary. In addition, it is not possible to estimate
the time of infection using laboratory results. Antibodies are detectable 10–14 days (see
Section 4.2.1.2) after infection and they probably remain for the whole productive life of the animals.
Consequently, detection of antibodies suggests that infection occurred > 10 days prior to detection of
antibodies, but no other inferences can be made upon the time of exposure on the basis of serological
results. No commercial tests are available for the detection of IgM and other more transient antibody
classes.
Origin of infection
Genomic information of PPRV can be useful for determining the geographical area of origin of the
PPRV of concern. PPRV can be divided into 4 genetically distinct lineages based on the nucleocapsid
(N) gene, with different and distinct geographical patterns (see Section 2.1).
4.1.1.3. For granting a specific derogation from killing animals of the categories
described in article 13.2 of the Delegated Regulation in a PPR affected
establishment
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of listed species
belonging to the categories described in article 13(2) of an affected establishment, in order to grant a
specific derogation from killing these animals, while ensuring that they do not pose a risk for the
transmission of the disease. For further details, see Annexes B and C.
• 3rd Scenario of sampling procedure.
• ToR 1.1 and ToR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate.
• Article 13(3)c of the Delegated Regulation.
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns an affected establishment where infection is officially confirmed;
2) In the establishment where there are kept animals of listed species of the following specific categories
animal categories based on article 13(2):
a) animals kept in a confined establishment;
b) animals kept for scientific purposes or purposes related to conservation of protected or
endangered species;
c) animals officially registered in advance as rare breeds;
d) animals with a duly justified high genetic, cultural or educational value.
3) Competent authority collects samples for laboratory examination;
4) The purposes of the sampling are:
a) supporting the epidemiological enquiry to:
i) identify the likely origin of the disease;
ii) calculate the likely length of time that the disease is present;
iii) identify establishments where the animals could have contracted the disease and movements
from the affected establishment that could have led to the spread of the disease; and
iv) obtain information on the likely spread of the listed disease in the surrounding environment,
including the presence and distribution of disease vectors
b) confirming/ruling out disease in the event of preventive killing.
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Summary of sampling procedures
There are no sampling procedures to grant a derogation from killing of animals in an affected
establishment.
Assessment
Animals in an affected establishment and for which a specific derogation from killing has been
granted should be subjected to clinical and laboratory examination. Sampling procedures should
ensure that the animals do not pose a risk of transmission if left alive.
Animals of the holding that are negative for antibodies and virus do not pose a risk of transmission
of PPR. Recovered animals with antibody positive results only do not pose a risk of transmission.
Development of new procedures
General evaluation of the health status of all the animals in the establishment should be carried
out, preferably every day, to detect early the onset of clinical signs, for a period of at least the existing
monitoring period of 21 days calculated forwards from the day of confirmation of the latest case.
All the animals intended derogation from killing should be subjected to thorough individual clinical
examination at two weeks intervals to identify those animals with clinical signs in order to take
samples for virological testing (see Section 4.1.1.1 for details).
Sampling all the animals for derogation for laboratory examination (both for virus detection and
antibodies), as soon as the derogation from killing is granted and irrespectively of the presence of
clinical signs, will enable to identify also infected animals without clinical signs, estimate the prevalence
of PPR in the establishment and evaluate the risk. Sampling for laboratory examination can be
repeated at any time, but the last sampling should be carried out not earlier than 21 days calculated
forwards from the day of confirmation of the latest case.
Sampling procedures for laboratory examinations in order to detect or rule out the presence of PPR
virus should follow the procedures described in the Section 4.1.1.1.
4.1.1.4. For the animals of non-listed species kept in an affected establishment by PPR
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures,
based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of non-listed species
kept in an affected establishment, in their ability to ensure the detection of the virus if the virus is
present in these species. For further details, see Annex B.
• 4th scenario of sampling procedures.
• ToR 1.1 and ToR 1.2 in accordance with Article 14(1) of the Delegated Regulation.
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429.
• Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882 on listed species.
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns an affected establishment officially confirmed;
2) In the affected establishment there are kept animals of non-listed species of epidemiological
relevance for the control of the disease;
3) Animals of non-listed species are those animals that are not listed in Commission
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 for each of the category A diseases;
4) The animal species acting purely as mechanical carriers of the virus will not be covered;
5) The competent authority is not obliged to carry out the sampling of non-listed species, but
they may establish it in addition to other measures;
6) The purpose of the sampling procedures is to ensure detection of the virus in these species.
3) the competent authority may grant specific derogation from killing all the animals of listed species
belonging to any of the above categories in an affected establishment, provided that specific
conditions are fulfilled;
4) The animals should be subjected to clinical surveillance, including laboratory examinations;
5) Sampling procedures should ensure that the animals do not pose a risk of transmission of the
category A disease if left alive.
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Summary of sampling procedures
There are no sampling procedures defined for of non-listed species kept in an affected
establishment by PPR.
Assessment
The listed species for PPR according to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/18823 are
Ovis spp., Capra spp., Camelidae and Cervidae.
Where other susceptible domestic animals are also kept, these should also be sampled. Those
should be tested for both the presence of virus by PCR and/or viral isolation as well as for serology.
Although there is no evidence from literature or other reports (Fine et al., 2020) suggesting that PPRV
could naturally spread by intraspecies transmission between pigs and wild boar, suids should be
considered as possible source of infection as suggested by experimental infections and possible
facilitators for the introduction and spread of PPRV into the European Union (see Section 2.2.). Schulz
et al. (2018) showed that domestic pigs and wild boars infected with PPRV may excrete the virus and
transmit the disease to in-contact pigs and goats. In the late 1970s, a contact transmission of a PPRV
lineage II, known to be mild, had shown the passage of the virus from goat to contact pigs. Pigs in
trials showed subclinical to only mild clinical signs. Regarding rinderpest, a virus closely related to
PPRV, common warthog (Phacochoerus africanus) was reported to be highly susceptible (Plowright,
1968, 1987). However, for PPRV, there is no evidence to suggest that this is the case.
Therefore pigs, if kept in an affected establishment affected by PPR, should be also tested for PPR.
4.1.1.5. For wild animals of the listed species within the PPR affected establishment and
its surroundings
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures,
based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the wild animals of listed species
within the affected establishment and in its surroundings. The purpose of the sampling procedures is
to ensure the detection of the virus, if the virus is present in these wild species. For further details, see
Annex B.
Summary of sampling procedures
There are no sampling procedures defined for wild animals of the listed species within the PPR
affected establishment and its surroundings.
Assessment
In the scenario where wild cervids (e.g. roe deer, red deer, fallow deer) or wild bovids (e.g. muflon,
chamois, ibex, etc.) are kept or living in the surrounding area of the affected establishment, these may
acquire the infection by direct or indirect contact with affected animals, if no or low biosecurity
measures are in place to keep animal species separated.
• 5th scenario of sampling procedures.
• ToR 1.1 and ToR 1.2 in accordance with Article 14(1) of the Delegated Regulation.
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429.
• Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882 on listed species.
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns an affected by PPR establishment officially confirmed.
2) They may exist wild animals of listed species within the establishment and in the surroundings of the
establishment.
3) As listed in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 for PPR; the wild animals of listed
species animals are Cervidae.
4) The competent authority may establish these sampling procedures in addition to other measures.
5) The purpose of the sampling procedures in wild animals of listed species is to ensure the detection of
the virus, if the virus is present in these wild species.
3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018R1882&from=EN
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Development of new procedures
The surveillance of wildlife around the affected establishment may include the visual inspection of
these animals from distance and the testing of fallen stock and hunted animals both by PCR and
serology (the latter not validated in wild species for PPR). Unexpected mortality events in susceptible
wildlife should be investigated.
Samples from animals with clinical signs from dead or hunted animals should be collected for
laboratory analysis, following the procedures of the Section 4.1.1.1. Wildlife population health experts
would be able to provide additional advice in these circumstances.
4.1.1.6. For animals of listed species in the non-affected establishments located in a
protection zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of listed species in
establishments located in the protection zone. The purpose of the sampling procedures is to ensure
the detection of the virus, if the virus is present in these animals. For further details, see Annexes B
and C.
Summary of sampling procedures
There are no sampling procedures defined for animals of listed species in the non-affected
establishments located in a protection zone for PPR.
Assessment
All establishments located in the protection zone should be visited and the animals should be
subjected to clinical surveillance (for details, see Section 4.1.1.1), including a laboratory examination
to ensure the detection of the virus, if the virus is present in these animals.
Development of new procedures
For the purpose of this scenario, the guidelines provided in Section 4.1.1.1 can be followed based
on whether clinical signs are observed or not at the clinical examination.
Active surveillance via serological or virological testing of randomly selected animals (i.e. in in the
absence of clinical signs) should be conducted only if this could be considered necessary due to
epidemiological considerations such as spread of a low virulent strain of the virus with none or very
little clinical signs.
4.1.1.7. For non-affected establishments located in a protection zone with a radius larger
than 3 km
This scenario is not applicable, since for PPR it is not proposed for a protection zone larger than
3 km.
4.1.1.8. For non-affected establishments located in a surveillance zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures,
based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of listed species, for
the sampling of the establishments located within the surveillance zone. The purpose of the sampling
• 6th Scenario of sampling procedures.
• ToR 1.1 and ToR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate.
• Article 26(2) of the Delegated Regulation.
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns the protection zone with radius up to 3 km;
2) Official veterinarians must visit at least once all the non-affected establishments with kept animals of
listed species located in the protection zone;
3) Among others, they must perform a clinical examination of kept animals of listed species and if
necessary, collection of samples for laboratory examination;
4) The purpose of sampling procedures is to confirm or rule out the presence of a category A disease.
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procedure is to ensure disease detection if the virus is present in establishments within the surveillance
zone. For further details, see Annex B.
Summary of sampling procedures
There are no sampling procedures defined for animals of listed species in the non-affected
establishments located in a protection zone for PPR.
Assessment
It is extremely unlikely (1–5%) (EFSA Scientific Committee, 2018) that establishments in this zone,
not epidemiologically linked to an outbreak, will become infected with PPRV without having additional
outbreaks in the protection zone.
Consequently, for the surveillance zone, it is recommended that the efforts will be allocated to
enhance passive surveillance by increasing awareness in all establishments, industry and public.
Development of new procedures
Any establishment where generic signs of disease such as fever, lethargy, lost appetite, nasal/oral
discharge and even changes in the individual animal behaviour and /or in the feed intake are reported
should be visited, the animals should be clinically examined and samples should be collected following
the procedures described in Section 4.1.1.1.
Establishments in the surveillance zone epidemiologically linked to an affected establishment or to
any other establishment in the protection zone, should be also visited; the animals should be clinically
examined, and samples should be collected in case a suspicion is raised following the procedures
described in Section 4.1.1.1.
4.1.2. Assessment of sampling procedures to grant derogations for animal
movements
4.1.2.1. From non-affected establishments located in the protection zone to
slaughterhouses located within the protection zone or in the surveillance zone or
outside the restricted zone
• 8th scenario of sampling procedures:
• ToR 1.3 in accordance with Article 41 of the Delegated Regulation.
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) Ιt concerns the surveillance zone;
2) Sample of the establishments of kept animals of listed species in the surveillance zone;
3) Official veterinarians carry out visits to a sample of the establishments among others perform clinical
examination of kept animals of listed species and if necessary, collection of samples for laboratory
examination;
4) The purpose of sampling procedure is to ensure the detection of the disease if the disease is present
in any of the establishments.
• 9th Scenario of sampling procedures.
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Article 28(5) of the Delegated Regulation.
• Article 29 of the Delegated Regulation.
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the protection zone;
2) Grant derogation for movement of kept animals of listed species from a non-affected establishment in
the protection zone;
3) Animals to be moved to a slaughterhouse located within the protection zone or in the surveillance
zone or outside the restricted zone;
4) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved.
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The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of an establishment in a protection
zone, in order to grant a derogation from prohibitions in the movement of animals, and allow for the
animals to be moved to a slaughterhouse located within the protection zone or in the surveillance zone
or outside the restricted zone (Art. 29). For further details, see Annex B.
Summary of sampling procedures
No sampling procedures are defined for PPR for this scenario.
Assessment
As noted above, clinical examination of listed species is not sensitive enough to confirm PPR when
outside the diagnostic window. There is then a risk of undiagnosed infected animals spreading the
disease during movement. Sending the animals to slaughter undoubtedly reduces this risk. This
scenario applies to listed animals that are moved: (a) from the protection zone to a slaughterhouse in
the protection zone; (b) from the protection zone to a slaughterhouse in the surveillance zone; and (c)
from the protection zone to a slaughterhouse outside the restriction zones. The risk of spreading the
disease from undiagnosed animals increases from (a) to (c).
In the event animals to be moved would be found ill whether in a subunit or in contact with all the
other animals, laboratory samples must be collected and the assessment remains as per
Section 4.1.1.1. In addition, post-mortem examination of these animals, for collection of different
organ samples such as lung, spleen or lymph nodes for virological tests must be taken at slaughter
and processed according to scenario 4.1.1.1.
Development of new procedures
Clinical examinations must be carried out in each subunit of the establishment in which the kept
listed species are to be moved following the procedures described in the Section 4.1.1.1.
If one or more animals exhibit clinical signs consistent with PPR, the establishment is considered
suspected and confirmation follows the procedures described in the Section 4.1.1.1 for appropriate
laboratory investigation.
If individual clinical examination of all the animals is not feasible, in that case the plan is to examine
the number of animals indicated by the sample size calculations, with at least 95% confidence as
described in the Section 4.1.1.1.
If listed animals are moved from the protection zone to a slaughterhouse outside the restriction
zones, as described in (c), clinical examination and sample collection for laboratory investigation for
should be performed as described in the Section 4.1.1.1.
4.1.2.2. From non-affected establishments located in the protection zone to a plant
approved for processing or disposal of animal by-products in which the animals
are immediately killed
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of an establishment in a protection
zone, in order to grant derogation from prohibitions in the movement of these animals to a plant
approved for processing or disposal of animal by-products in which the kept animals are immediately
killed (Art. 37). For further details, see Annexes B and C.
• 12th Scenario of sampling procedures.
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate.
• Article 28(5) and article 37 of the Delegated Regulation.
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the protection zone;
2) To grant derogation for movement of kept animals of listed species from a non-affected establishment
in the protection zone;
3) The animals to be moved to a plant approved for processing or disposal of animal by-products in
which the kept animals are immediately killed;
4) Clinical examinations and laboratory examinations of animals kept in the establishment, including
those animals to be moved.
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Summary of sampling procedures
No specific guidelines on sampling procedures for clinical or laboratory examination were found for
the 12th Scenario in EU legislation.
Assessment
This scenario is very similar to the scenario of the Section 4.1.2.1 and therefore the assessment is
the same.
Development of new procedures
This scenario is very similar to the 9th scenario of the Section 4.1.2.1; therefore, the same new
procedures are suggested.
4.1.2.3. From an establishment in a surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse located within
or outside the restricted zone and from an establishment outside the surveillance
zone to a slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of listed species in order to grant
derogation from prohibitions and allow for these animals to be moved: (a) from an establishment in a
surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse located within or outside the restricted zone, (b) from an
establishment outside the surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone. For
further details, see Annexes B and C.
Summary of sampling procedures
No sampling procedures are defined for PPR for this scenario.
Assessment
This scenario is very similar to the scenario of the Section 4.1.2.1 and therefore the assessment is
the same.
Development of new procedures
To grant derogations for animal movements from an establishment in a surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse located outside the restricted zone, clinical examination and sample collection for
laboratory investigation for should be performed as described in the Section 4.1.1.1.
For animals intended to be moved from an establishment located outside the surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone, there is no need for laboratory examination, if there
are no other reasons based on the national risk assessment to recommended it (e.g. epidemiological
link with affected establishment or with affected or high-risk area). Only clinical examination as
described above would be enough.
4.1.2.4. From an establishment in a surveillance zone to pastures situated within the
surveillance zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of kept ungulates of listed species in order to grant a
• 13th Scenario of sampling procedures.
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate.
• Article 43(5) and article 44 of the Delegated Regulation.
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the:
1) It concerns kept animals of listed species of the establishments in the surveillance zone;
2) To grant derogation for movement from an establishment in the surveillance zone to be moved to a
slaughterhouse within the restricted zone or outside the restricted zone;
3) To grant derogation for movement from an establishment outside the surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone;
4) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved.
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derogation and allow for the animals to be moved from an establishment in the surveillance zone to
pastures situated within the surveillance zone. For further details, see Annex B.
Summary of sampling procedures
No sampling procedures are defined for PPR for this scenario.
Assessment
Animals in a surveillance zone, for which a specific derogation has been granted to be moved to
pastures, should be subjected to clinical surveillance, including laboratory examinations.
Sampling procedures for laboratory examination should ensure, with a confidence level of 95%,
that the animals do not pose a risk of transmission.
Animals of the holding that are negative at the clinical examination and are negative according to
procedures described in the Section 4.1.1.1 do pose negligible risk of transmission of PPR.
4.1.2.5. From an establishment in a surveillance zone to an establishment belonging to
the same supply chain, located in or outside the surveillance zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of kept ungulates of listed species in order to grant
derogation and allow to be moved from an establishment in the surveillance zone to an establishment
belonging to the same supply chain, located in or outside the surveillance zone, in order to complete
the production cycle before slaughter. For further details, see Annex B.
Summary of sampling procedures
No specific guidelines on sampling procedures for clinical or laboratory examinations were found for
the 15th Scenario in EU legislation.
Assessment
Animals in a surveillance zone, for which a specific derogation has been granted to be moved to an
establishment of the same supply chain located in or outside the surveillance zone, should be
subjected to clinical examination, including laboratory examinations.
Sampling procedures for laboratory examination should ensure, with a confidence level of 95%,
that the animals do not pose a risk of transmission.
• 14th scenario of sampling procedures.
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with article 43(5) and article 45(1) of the Delegated Regulation.
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns kept animals of listed species from establishments located in the surveillance zone;
2) To grant derogation for movement from the surveillance zone;
3) To be moved to pastures situated within the surveillance zone;
4) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved.
• 15th scenario of sampling procedures.
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with article 43(5) and article 45(2) of the Delegated Regulation.
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the surveillance zone;
2) Grant derogation for movement of kept animals of listed species;
3) from the surveillance zone;
4) To be moved to an establishment belonging to the same supply chain, located in or outside the
surveillance zone, to complete the production cycle before slaughter;
5) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved.
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Moving animals from a non-affected establishment found negative at the clinical examination and
negative to virus and antibodies in laboratory examination, according to procedures described in the
Section 4.1.1.1 minimise the risk of PPRV transmission.
Development of new procedures
All the animals in the establishment of origin should be clinically examined before their movement
to an establishment belonging to the same supply chain, following the procedures described in the
Section 4.1.1.1. Visual inspection of the herd would be helpful to identify animals with signs
compatible to PPR.
In an establishment where the number of animals is large, the individual clinical examination of all
the animals may not be feasible; in this case, a minimum sample of animals (including all animals to
be moved) should be clinically examined to detect or rule out the presence of animals with clinical
signs with at least 95% confidence, as described in the Section 4.1.1.1.
In case clinical signs compatible to PPR are identified, the establishment is considered suspected
and the procedures for the laboratory confirmation as described in the Section 4.1.1.1 should be
followed, and movement prohibited until confirmation of being negative. The dispatch of animals of
the listed species to an establishment belonging to the same supply chain should be done after
sampling for laboratory examination, following the procedures described in the Section 4.1.1.1, in
order to exclude infected but subclinical animals with a confidence level of 95%.
4.1.2.6. From an establishment located in the restricted zone to move within the
restricted zone when restriction measures are maintained beyond the period set
out in Annex XI of the Delegated Regulation
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of an establishment located in the
restricted zone of an outbreak in order to allow their move within the restricted zone, when restriction
measures are maintained beyond the period set out in Annex XI of the Delegated Regulation. For
further details, see Annex B.
Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
No specific guidelines on sampling procedures for clinical or laboratory examination were found for
the 18th Scenario.
Assessment
Animals in the restricted zone, for which a specific derogation has been granted for movement
within the restricted zone, should be subjected to clinical examination; if they are not immediately
slaughtered, they should also be sampled for laboratory examinations.
Sampling procedures for laboratory examination should ensure, with a confidence level of 95%,
that the animals do not pose a risk of transmission.
Moving animals from non-affected establishments that are negative at the clinical examination and
negative at laboratory examination, according to the procedures described in the Sections 4.1.1.1 and
4.1.1.2 minimise the risk of PPRV transmission.
• 18th scenario of sampling procedures.
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with article 56(1) of the Delegated Regulation.
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the restricted zone when restriction measures are maintained beyond the period set out in
Annex XI;
2) To grant derogation for movement of kept animals of listed species from an establishment within the
restricted zone;
3) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved.
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Development of new procedures
Sampling procedures should be implemented as described in Sections 4.1.2.1, 4.1.2.3, 4.1.2.4 and
4.1.2.5.
4.1.3. Assessment of sampling procedures for repopulation purposes
4.1.3.1. For the animals that are kept for the repopulation prior to their introduction
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on laboratory examinations of the animals that are kept for the repopulation prior to their
introduction to rule out the presence of the disease. For further details, see Annex B.
Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
No specific guidelines on sampling procedures for laboratory examination were found for the 19th
scenario.
Assessment
For animals kept for repopulation, clinical examination and sampling should be used as standard
procedures to ensure that the animals do not pose a risk of PPR transmission. For animals that are
introduced from disease free areas outside the restricted zone, sampling can be omitted because they
have not been exposed to virus before entry and, consequently, can only produce a negative test
result.
Animals that are negative at the clinical examination and are negative according to laboratory
procedures described in the Section 4.1.1.1 do pose very low risk of transmission of PPRV.
Development of new procedures
Animals intended for repopulation should be subjected to clinical examinations.
In an establishment where the number of animals is large, the individual clinical examination of all
the animals may not be feasible; in this case a minimum sample of animals (including all animals to be
moved) should be clinically examined to detect or rule out the presence of animals with clinical signs
with at least 95% confidence, as described in the Section 4.1.1.1.
In case clinical signs compatible to PPR are identified, the establishment is considered suspected
and the procedures for the laboratory confirmation as described in the Section 4.1.1.1 should be
followed. The animals intended for the repopulation, even if clinically healthy, should not be
dispatched.
If animals are sourced from restricted areas, all the animals in the establishment of origin should be
sampled. Sampling procedures for laboratory examination should ensure, with a confidence level of
95%, that the animals do not pose a risk of transmission. Laboratory examinations should be in
accordance with the procedures described in the Section 4.1.1.1.
In case the animals originate from establishments located in free areas, there is no need for
laboratory examination if there are no other reasons based on the authorities’ risk assessment to
• 19th scenario of sampling procedures.
• ToR 1.5 in accordance with article 59(2) of the Delegated Regulation.
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the repopulation of a previous affected establishment;
2) Animals intended to repopulation shall be sampled prior to their introduction into the establishment of
destination;
3) The samples shall be collected from a representative number of animals to be introduced of each
consignment from each establishment or from a representative number of animals of each
consignment (if animals are all to be introduced at different times or from different establishments of
origin);
4) Laboratory examinations;
5) The purpose sampling procedures is to rule out the presence of the disease.
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recommend it (e.g. epidemiological link with an affected establishment or with an affected or high risk
area). Clinical examination as described above would be enough.
4.1.3.2. In the event of unusual mortalities or clinical signs being notified during the
repopulation
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on laboratory examinations of the animals that have been repopulated, in the event of unusual
mortalities or clinical signs being notified during the repopulation; to rule out the presence of the
disease. For further details, see Annex B.
Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
No specific guidelines on sampling procedures for laboratory examination were found for the 20th
scenario.
Assessment
In the case of unusual mortalities or clinical signs compatible with PPR notified during the
repopulation, it is important to rule out the presence of the disease.
Development of new procedures
In the event of animals with clinical signs compatible with PPR, as they have been described in
Section 4.1.1.1, are notified during the repopulation, the establishment is considered suspected. The
repopulation should be stopped and the procedures for the laboratory confirmation as described in the
Section 4.1.1.1 should be followed.
In addition, the establishments from where the suspected animals are coming from, should be
considered as suspected; the procedures described in the Section 4.1.1.1 should be followed as well.
4.1.3.3. For animals that have been repopulated
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on laboratory examinations of the animals that have been repopulated, on the last day of the
monitoring period calculated forward from the date on which the animals were placed in the
repopulated establishment. In case the repopulation takes place in several days, the monitoring period
will be calculated forward from the last day in which the last animal is introduced in the establishment.
For further details, see Annex B.
• 20th scenario of sampling procedures.
• ToR 1.5 in accordance with article 59(9) of the Delegated Regulation.
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the repopulated establishment;
2) Unusual mortalities or clinical signs during the repopulation;
3) The official veterinarians shall without delay collect samples for laboratory examination;
4) The purpose of sampling procedures is to rule out the presence of the disease.
• 21st scenario of sampling procedures.
• ToR 1.5 in accordance with article 59(5) of the Delegated Regulation.
The following elements of the scenario were taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the repopulated establishment;
2) Animals that have been used for repopulation;
3) Laboratory examinations;
4) Sampling procedures to rule out the presence of the disease.
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Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
No specific guidelines on sampling procedures for laboratory examination were found for the 21st scenario.
Assessment
During the repopulation of an establishment previously affected by PPR, there is still a risk of re-
introduction of the disease with the new animals being infected either at the establishment of origin or
during their transport, and a risk of re-emergence of the disease if the new animals are infected after
their arrival at the establishment of destination. The animals that have been used for the repopulation
should be submitted to thorough clinical and, if showing signs, laboratory examination in order to rule
out the presence of the disease.
Development of new procedures
Animals must be subjected to clinical inspection at least every three days for the first 14 days
following the introduction, and weekly from 15 to at least 21 days (monitoring period as defined in the
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687) after re-introduction. The last day of the monitoring
period following the latest day of animals’ introduction, all the animals should be subjected to
thorough clinical examination as described in Section 4.1.1.1. and should be sampled for laboratory
examination in accordance with the procedures described there.
In an establishment where the number of animals is large, the individual clinical examination of all
the animals may not be feasible; in this case a minimum sample of animals (including all animals to be
moved) should be clinically examined, to detect or rule out the presence of animals with clinical signs
with at least 95% confidence, as described in the Section 4.1.1.1.
If clinical signs are identified, then the procedures for the laboratory confirmation that are
described in the Section 4.1.1.1 should be followed.
4.2. Assessment of the length of the monitoring period
The concept of the monitoring period was introduced as a management tool for the investigation
and control of suspected and confirmed outbreaks of Category A diseases in terrestrial animals. This
tool aimed to standardise the methodology by which relevant authorities responded to suspected and
confirmed cases of these diseases. In this regard, a disease-specific monitoring period was set for
each of the 14 diseases included in the Category A list. Throughout the EU legislation, the monitoring
period is used as an aid in the control of these diseases, although the specific purpose in which the
monitoring period is used varies depending on the articles of the legislation.
The length of the monitoring period for each disease is set out in Annex II of the Commission
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 supplementing the rules laid down in Part III of Regulation (EU)
2016/429 (Animal Health Law).
The table in Annex D in this manuscript describes the seven scenarios for which an assessment of
the length of the monitoring period for PPR had been requested.
4.2.1. Results
4.2.1.1. Period between the earliest point of infection and suspicion report
The details of the review protocol are in Annex J. A search was carried out identifying 277
references published after 1/1/2000 (because of the small number of references retrieved for
European countries (n = 2), the selection was extended to the rest of the world). Among the 277
references, 10 were selected to be included in the qualitative review. The full selection process is
displayed in Figure 5.
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Half of the references reported dates instead of periods; these dates were used to calculate the
periods of interest. Information on the main outcome of interest, the period between the earliest point
of infection and the suspicion report, was only retrieved from three references (Table 4), two of which
were not considered relevant for the scope of this exercise.
Based on worldwide experience, it is expected that in case of an introduction of PPR in Europe,
goats would show more severe signs than sheep. Therefore, we may assume that an outbreak in a
goat flock would be detected more easily and earlier than in sheep (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2015).
Thus, because only three references with information on the main outcome of interest were
extracted, two of which were not considered representative for the European context, data were also
extracted for other period of interest i.e. the period between first suspicion and the suspicion report.
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Figure 5: PRISMA diagram PPR Monitoring period ELS
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For the purpose of this assessment, the period between the earliest point of infection and the
suspicion report was then reconstructed by adding the length of the incubation period as obtained in
the literature, to the period between first suspicion and the suspicion report as presented in Table 4.
Three references were extracted where this period had been calculated.
According to the OIE, the incubation period can range from 3 to 10 days (mean = 7 days). To
reconstruct the period between the earliest point of infection and the suspicion report, the mean of
the incubation period (7 days) can be added to the median of the period between suspicion and the
suspicion report (14 days), resulting in an estimate of 21 days (14 + 7). In a similar manner, the
maximum period between the earliest point of infection and the suspicion report can be reconstructed
as 33 days, by adding the maximum incubation period (10 days) to the maximum period between first
suspicion and suspicion report (23 days).
4.2.1.2. Seroconversion in animals
The results regarding the range of days for seroconversion and the latest detected day of antibody
presence in listed species of PPR after experimental infection with PPRV is presented in Table 5.
Species Capra spp. and Ovis spp.
According to the available scientific literature reviewed, the seroconversion date for Capra spp.
ranged between 6 and 13 days post infection (dpi)4 and for Ovis spp. ranged between 5 and 11 dpi.
Differences among studies regarding the ELISA tests used, the methods of infection (route of
infection, TCID50 per animal) and the lineages used, did not yield major differences in the range of
seroconversion. The use of VNT for antibodies detection seemed to give positive results only after the
first week post infection; the small number of studies and the different blood sampling intervals after
infection among studies warrant caution for the interpretation of this finding. The latest day of
antibody detection coincided with the duration of the experimental study after the infection of the
animals. In most studies, animals were euthanized or slaughtered soon after the severity of PPR signs
worsened, usually between first and second week post infection. In studies where antibodies were
monitored after the second week post infection, animals remained seropositive until the end of the
study: Liu et al. (2013) reported that goats remained seropositive until 240 dpi.
Schulz et al. (2018) infected pigs and wild boars with PPRV and added 2 contact control goats 2
days later. Goats seroconverted at 15–24 dpi. Of those, one was euthanized at 18 dpi and the second
at 30 dpi; both remained seropositive until then.
Table 4: Summary of the period of interest (days) in the outbreak reporting process














China 2014 Date report minus
date first clinical signs
(days)
23 23
OIE (2016) Georgia 2016 Date report minus
date first clinical signs
(days)
14
PAFF (2018) Bulgaria 2018 NA (Reported as such) 10 15
*: Based on first observed clinical signs of PPR.
4 This means that in the experiments considered the earliest animals seroconverted at 6 while the latest animals seroconverted
at 13 dpi.
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Goats C- ELISA 6a,b (Wernike et al.,
2014)
12a (Pope et al.,
2013)
13b (Wani et al.,
2018)
21a (Pope et al., 2013)
240b (Liu et al., 2013)
16 (Couacy-Hymann et al., 2007; El Harrak et al.,
2012; Pope et al., 2013; Truong et al., 2014;
Wernike et al., 2014; Muniraju et al., 2015;
Holzer et al., 2016; Schulz et al., 2018; Wani
et al., 2018; Bamouh et al., 2019; Enchery
et al., 2019; Begum et al., 2020; Mahapatra
et al., 2020)
15e 24 28 1 (Pope et al., 2013)
H-ELISA 7a – N/S 1 (El Harrak et al., 2012)
9b – N/S
bELISA 9a – 10 1 (Bamouh et al., 2019)
Indirect Ab
ELISA
8a+b – 21 1 (Truong et al., 2014)
VNT 11a+b (Truong et al.,
2014)
14b (Liu et al., 2013)
– 240b (Liu et al., 2013) 3 (Liu et al., 2013; Truong et al., 2014; Li et al.,
2018)
Ovis spp. Sheep C-ELISA 5c (Rojas et al.,
2014)
6b (Wernike et al.,
2014)
– 13c (Rojas et al., 2014)
21b (Schulz et al., 2018;
Wani et al., 2018)
4 (Rojas et al., 2014; Wernike et al., 2014;
Schulz et al., 2018; Wani et al., 2018)
Indirect Ab
ELISA
8a+b – 21 1 (Truong et al., 2014)
VNT 11a+b – 21 1 (Truong et al., 2014)
Camelidae Dromedary
camels
VNT 14c 28 42 1 (Fakri et al., 2019)
Cervidae White-tailed
deer
CF, SN 21d 21 21 1 (Hamdy and Dardiri, 1976)
N/S: not specified; VNT: virus neutralising titre; SN: serum neutralisation; CF: complement fixation; C-ELISA: competitive ELISA; H-ELISA: haemagglutinin ELISA; bELISA: blocking ELISA; indirect
Ab ELISA: indirect antibody ELISA.
a: Intranasal infection; b: subcutaneous infection; c: intravenous infection; a + b: Intranasal infection + subcutaneous infection in the same animal; d: intramuscular infection; e: in contact with
infected animals.
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Camelidae
One study with PPRV challenge of dromedary camels fulfilled the inclusion criteria. Animals were
blood sampled in 7 days intervals post-infection. Serum antibodies were detected with VNT. The range
of days for seroconversion was 14–28 dpi, while the latest day of antibodies detection was 42 dpi (end
of study).
Cervidae
One study with PPRV challenge of white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) fulfilled the inclusion
criteria. Blood sampling was performed at 14 and 21 dpi. Serum antibodies were detected with
complement fixation and serum neutralisation tests. PPRV antibodies were detected at 21 dpi.
Cattle (Bos taurus)
Two studies with PPRV challenge of cattle fulfilled the inclusion criteria: one with adult cattle and
another one with calves. The range of days for seroconversion was 9–15 dpi for adult animals and 21
dpi for calves. Again, the latest day of antibody detection depended only the duration of the
experimental study after the infection of the animals. Adult cattle remained seropositive by 30 dpi (end
of study), while infected calves remained seropositive by 397 dpi.
Pig (Sus scrofa)
Only one study with PPRV challenge of domestic pigs and wild boars fulfilled the inclusion criteria.
Antibodies were detected with C-ELISA (N-protein end). The range of days until seroconversion was 7–
10 dpi, while the latest day of antibody detection was 30 dpi (end of study).
Assessment
Considering the results presented above, an assessment of the effectiveness of the current
monitoring period for PPR, depending on the purpose of that period in the different scenarios shown in
Annex C, was carried out. For PPR, the length of the monitoring period as defined in Annex II of the
Delegated Regulation is 21 days.
Scenarios 1, 2 and 3
• 1st scenario of monitoring period.
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 8 and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation.
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429.
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of the notification of the suspicion of a category A disease in an establishment
with kept animals of listed species, for the purposes of the epidemiological enquiry in the event of a
suspicion of a PPR outbreak.
• 2nd scenario of monitoring period.
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 17(2) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation.
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429.
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of notification of the suspicion of a category A disease in an establishment with
kept animals of listed species, for the purposes of the epidemiological enquiry in the event of
confirmation of a PPR outbreak.
• 3rd scenario of monitoring period.
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 13(b) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation.
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of confirmation of a PPR outbreak in an epidemiological unit in which the
disease has not been confirmed, in order to provide derogations from killing the animals in this unit, if
this unit has been completely separated, and handled by different personnel during this monitoring
period.
Control measures for PPR
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 35 EFSA Journal 2021;19(7):6708
For the first three scenarios, the main purpose of the use of the monitoring period is to be able to
carry out a full epidemiological investigation (i.e. in Scenarios 1 and 2, at the time of the suspicion and
confirmation, respectively), or part of the epidemiological investigation (i.e. Scenario 3, where the aim
is to identify any possible epidemiological links between the affected establishment and any separated
non-affected epidemiological units).
The length of the monitoring period should then dictate how far backward or forward the activities
related to tracing (and other activities needed during an epidemiological investigation) should go
(checks for production records, animal movement records, etc.). This monitoring period is the time,
where the infection could have been present unknowingly in an establishment, and due to the regular
activities carried out in this establishment, could have spread to other epidemiological units.
In the case of Scenario 3, if no epidemiological links between the establishment that has been
confirmed positive and the other epidemiological units are found during the investigation (and only if
other conditions described in the legislation are met), a derogation from killing the animals in the
separated non-affected epidemiological units could be granted.
The period of time the disease could have been present, unknowingly, in an establishment, equates
then to the time period between the entry of PPR into the establishment, and the reporting of the
suspicion. Once the suspicion has been officially reported, control measures are implemented, and
further spread should in this way be prevented.
Based on the ELS carried out and presented above, the length of the time between the earliest
point of infection and the suspicion report, reconstructed as described above, was estimated at
between 13 and 33 days, with an average of 21 days. The monitoring period as defined in Annex II of
the Delegated Regulation of 21 days falls within this range and could thus be considered effective.
However, it is important to take into account that when the disease is first introduced in an area,
detection may be delayed. This should be taken into account when carrying out an epidemiological
investigation in the index case (first affected establishments) in an area. For that purpose, the
maximum period estimated as 33 days could be considered.
The length of the monitoring period of 21 days as defined in the Delegated Regulation is therefore
considered effective, except for the first affected establishments detected in an area, where a
monitoring period of 33 days, (the longest reconstructed period found in the ELS) is recommended.
The main purpose of the monitoring period in Scenario 4 is to ensure that certain products or
materials, likely to spread the disease, that have been produced in a non-affected establishment
located in the protection zone of an affected establishment, can be moved safely and without posing a
risk of disease spread. In this scenario, and in contrast with the previous three scenarios, the
establishment of concern is neither a suspected nor an affected establishment. For the assessment of
this scenario, we assume that the earliest plausible point of infection of these products or materials in
the establishment of concern would be the earliest plausible point of infection of the establishment
that originated the protection zone. If these products have been obtained or produced before the
earliest point of infection of the affected establishment, then they could be exempted from prohibitions
to be moved, as long as other conditions specified in the legislation are met (e.g. the products must
have been clearly separated during the production process, storage and transport, from products not
eligible for dispatch outside the restricted zone).
As the disease has already been detected in the area, and high awareness is expected, the average
length estimated above, i.e. 21 days, is considered effective in this scenario.
• Scenario 44th scenario of monitoring period.
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 27(3)c and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation.
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of notification of the suspicion of the PPR outbreak in the protection zone.
Products or other materials likely to spread the disease, must had been obtained or produced, before this
time period in order to be exempted from prohibitions of movements.
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Scenario 5
The aim of the monitoring period in this scenario is to ensure that semen from animals in a non-
affected establishment (located in a protection or surveillance zone) that has been collected and frozen
after the earliest time of infection of the affected establishment that originated the protection zone, is
safe to be moved without posing a risk of disease spread. In this scenario, EFSA is requested to assess
the length of time, after the semen was taken, when the animal should be tested in order to allow that
semen to be moved. Here, it is assumed that the earliest point of infection of the animal would be on, or
after the earliest point of infection of the affected establishment that originated the protection zone, and
the latest date the semen could have become contaminated would be the date the semen was collected.
In the case of a PPR outbreak, based on the existing legislation, the animals would have to be
tested not earlier than the time in days of the monitoring period plus seven days (21 + 7 = 28 days)
counted after the semen was taken.
There is, however, uncertainty regarding detection of PPRV in semen; no studies have been found
documenting this. Despite this, and assuming that missing an infected establishment as described
above would be plausible, below we summarise the assessment in the case that sheep or goats need
to be sampled via serology in order to assess the infection status of the animal at the time the semen
was taken (indicating whether the semen was infected or not). A negative serological test, if carried
out at the right time, would indicate that the animal has never been exposed to the agent, and
therefore it will indicate that the semen is free of the agent too.
Based on the results presented in Section 4.2.1 in relation to the seroconversion (in non-
vaccinated), na€ıve animals, the latest date of seroconversion was identified as 11 days for sheep and
13 days for goats.
Consequently, and based on the results of the publications, sampling the animals at least 28 (21 +
7) days after semen collection for antibody testing, as it is foreseen in the Delegated Regulation, and
with negative results, is considered effective to ensure that semen is safe to be moved without posing
a risk of disease spread.
Scenarios 6 and 7
In Scenarios 6 and 7, the monitoring period is used in the context of repopulation. In Scenario 6,
the monitoring period is used to ensure that the repopulation process is not put at risk due to the
disease still being present unknowingly in establishments within the surrounding area of the
establishment to be repopulated (if an establishment tested positive to PPR virus within a distance
• 6th scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 57 (1) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
forward from the date of the final cleaning and disinfection in an affected establishment, after which the
repopulation of the establishment may be allowed by the competent authority (assuming relevant control
of insects and rodents was carried out).
• 7th scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 59 (4) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
forward from the date the first animal was introduced for the purpose of repopulation, during this
monitoring period, all animals of the listed species intended for repopulation should be introduced.
• 5th scenario of monitoring period.
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 32 (c), article 48(c) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation.
• The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the
time period calculated forwards from the date of semen collection from animals of listed species kept in
approved germinal product establishments in the protection or in the surveillance zone, to prove that the
donor animal has tested favourable on a sample taken not earlier than 7 days after the monitoring
period.
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equal or lower to the radius of the surveillance zone, the repopulation process could not take place).
Repopulation can only take place after a number of days equal to the monitoring period has elapsed
since the final cleaning and disinfection of the affected establishment.
In this regard the number of days of the monitoring period for PPR, counted from the day of the
final cleaning and disinfection must ensure enough time for any potentially infected surrounding
establishment to be reported as a suspicion. Considering the results presented above, the monitoring
period as defined in Annex II of the Delegated Regulation of 21 days is considered effective for this
scenario.
In Scenario 7, the monitoring period must be counted forwards from the date in which the first
animal is introduced into the establishment to be repopulated, with all the animals intended for
repopulation of this establishment being introduced within the length of time of this monitoring period.
The aim of the monitoring period in this scenario is to ensure the early detection of any potentially
recently infected animal intended for repopulation once they have been moved into the repopulated
establishment. Although the preferred option is that all animals are introduced into the establishment
to be repopulated at the same time, this is not always feasible. The first clinical and laboratory
sampling of the repopulated animals takes place once all the animals are in situ. By restricting the
period of time during which animals may be introduced into the establishment, the period of time
during which the disease could be unknowingly spreading within the establishment is reduced.
Assuming that the latest point of infection of the first animal or batch of animals introduced into the
repopulated establishment is the day when the animals are moved, clinically ill animals would be
observed at the first visit, if this visit is carried out a number of days equal to the incubation period.
For PPR the incubation period is typically 4–6 days (range 3-10 days). The EFSA AHAW Panel thus
considers the existing length of the monitoring period as defined in Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation (21 days) effective as it would allow for early detection of potentially infected animals at
the first visit following re-stocking.
4.3. Assessment of the minimum radius and time periods of the
protection and surveillance zones set in place subsequent to a
disease outbreak
4.3.1. Assessment of the minimum radius
The purpose of this section, related to the question posed by ToR 3 of the mandate, is to assess
the effectiveness to control the spread of PPR by implementing a protection and surveillance zones of
a minimum radius, as set out in Annex V of the Delegated Regulation, surrounding the establishment
where the disease has been confirmed. Based on this regulation, the minimum radii of the protection
and surveillance zones for PPR should be of 3 and 10 km respectively (Annex E).
To assess this, transmission kernels have been used to estimate the minimum radius for PPR
spread, under the assumption of excluding the spread due to animal movements. Since no kernels
were available in the literature, these were derived from PPR outbreak data. According to OIE, in the
last 20 years, PPR has been reported in more than 30 countries in Africa and Asia, with more than
3,000 outbreaks. Outbreaks occurred in EU would give results better fitting to EU situation, but in the
EU PPR was reported only once in Bulgaria in 2018 (ADNS), with only seven outbreaks, which provides
too little information to estimate a kernel. The closer country to the EU where PPR was reported in
sufficient number of outbreaks is Turkey, where the disease is considered endemic at least since 2005,
despite the vaccination program in place since at least 2010 (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2015) (Figure 6). The
epidemiological trend of PPR in Turkey (many outbreaks reported every year continuously in the last
15 years at least) suggest that the control measures in place, in particular ban on animal movements,
may have not been completely and/or successfully implemented, thus creating a situation that would
neither fit the above-mentioned assumption (i.e. exclusion of disease spread due to animal movement)
nor the EU situation in case of PPR outbreaks (e.g. the quick containment of PPR outbreak in Bulgaria
in 2018).
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Given this, an alternative method has to be used for assessing the PPR minimum radius of spread.
In particular a parallel assessment can be done with sheep and goat pox (SGP), which has the same
hosts and similar epidemiology in term of transmission routes (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2015) and which
spread in EU (Greece and Bulgaria) in 2013–2014 (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2014). The main differences and
similarities between PPRV and SGPV are:
• PPRV is an enveloped negative single-stranded RNA virus, which is considered much more
fragile in the environment than SGPV, an enveloped, double-stranded DNA virus that may
persist in the environment for prolonged periods. PPRV like rinderpest virus, is inactivated by
ultraviolet light and desiccation within 3-4 days or less (depending on the specific environment),
and normally survives for very short periods in carcasses, while SGPV is susceptible to sunlight,
but remain viable in wool/hair/fleece and dry scabs on skin for up to 3 months. Thus, fomites
such as water, feed troughs and bedding can probably transmit PPRV for a short time, while
fomites and animal products can spread SGPV for at least 3 months.
• The incubation period for PPR can range from 2 to 10 days while for SGP from 4 to 21 days,
but is usually one or two weeks. For OIE, the maximum incubation period is 21 days for both
diseases. However, shedding begins for PPRV early in the incubation period and for SGPV
animals are most contagious during the first week after the onset of clinical signs (infected
experientially infectious for one to two months).
• Given the above, SGP are known to be extremely difficult to control using only total or modified
stamping out, animal movement restrictions and quarantine (Tuppurainen et al., 2017).
• Other differences that may be a source of bias: so far no evidence of sheep pox and goat pox
(SPGP) virus in wild ruminants exists, while PPRV affects a broad range of wildlife species. The
global distribution of SGP virus is wider than PPRV, but overlapping on the whole extent of PPR
distribution
Whereas similarities between these diseases can be underlined:
• Both PPR and SGP are highly contagious and transmission occurring through aerosols, needing
direct or close indirect contact, e.g. through fresh contaminated materials) with infected sheep
and goats shedding virus in oral, nasal and ocular secretions;
• Both diseases follow non-vector transmission pathways; the role of insect vectors in the field
remains unclear;
• Infection results in robust and long-lasting immunity more than 3 years for PPRV, 22 months for
SGP (Kitching, 2003);
• Animals affected by PPRV and SGPV usually clear the infection and do not become carriers.
Figure 6: Number of outbreaks of PPR reported in Turkey and Bulgaria since 2005 (Source: ADNS)
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This would account for a similar behaviour in transmission routes in the European context, and
given the main difference of SPGP virus, i.e. the persistence in the environment that may lead to
recurrent outbreaks in the same place, using sheep pox as epidemiological proxy for PPR may lead to
a slightly worse scenario.
Because suitable transmission kernels were not available for PPRV in EU situation, those for sheep
and goat pox were used as a proxy. These kernels were estimated using data on outbreaks of SPGP
reported in the Evros region of Greece from 2013 to 2014 (extracted from ADNS) (EFSA AHAW Panel,
2014). Four functional forms were fitted to the data (Table 6 and Figure 7), with the alternative fat-
tailed kernel yielding the best fit to the data.
The reason why only the outbreaks reported in Evros region were used for the analysis lies on the
fact that outbreaks that occurred outside this region were most likely linked to animal movements,
which would be in contrast with the assumption made above, i.e. exclusion of the spread due to
animal movements. In fact, in that epidemic most outbreaks (82) were reported in eastern Greece
(Evros regional unit) at the border with Turkey, but some of them also in the regional units of Rodopi
and Xanthi on the west of Evros, and even in Thessaloniki at almost 300 km of distance from Evros.
According to the Greek veterinary authorities, the two possible scenarios included the (i) spread from
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Figure 7: Kernels for the probability of transmission of sheep and goat pox at increasing distances if
transmission occurred from an affected establishment, used as a proxy for PPRV when
assessing the minimum size of the protection and surveillance zones
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Evros to Thessaloniki due to the owner of the first infected farm in Thessaloniki who was a truck
driver, frequently travelled to Evros; (ii) spread to other Greek regional units more on the West due to
uncontrolled movements of sheep and goat transported by animal traders from Greece’s Muslim
communities of Thrace: in all the outbreaks in the prefecture of Xanthi, the origin of which was
considered to be Turkey, as their onset coincided with visits of traders in search of animals for the
Islamic festival of Kurban Bayramı (when a large number of small ruminants is required for domestic
slaughter), which in 2013 took place on 14 October. This means that animal movement or transport of
infected fomites could not be excluded, thus leading to somehow overestimation of the probability of
spread.
For the alternative fat-tailed kernel in Table 7 (i.e. the best-fitting one), the probability of
transmission beyond given distances (if transmission were to occur from an infected establishment)
was computed using the estimates, lower 95% confidence limits and upper 95% confidence limits,
including beyond the proposed radius for the protection and surveillance zones (3 km and 10 km,
respectively) (Table 7). In addition, the distances at which a threshold probability of transmission
beyond that distance is reached were also calculated for each kernel using the estimates, lower 95%
confidence limits and upper 95% confidence limits (Table 8).
From Table 7, the estimate value of probability of transmission beyond protection zone of 3 km
radius if transmission occurred is 9.6% (95% CI: 3.1–25.8%) and 2.3% (95% CI 1–5.5%) for 10 km
radius (Table 7), which may be considered sufficient to contain the disease spread (95% probability of
containing transmission corresponds to 5.3 km, Table 8).
If the aim is to reduce the probability of transmission beyond the surveillance zone of 10 km to 1%
(and not 2.3% as assumed above), the radius should be increased to 19 km (95% CI 9.8–26.8). This,
nonetheless, would on average increase the number of farms in the surveillance zone (affected by
movement restrictions) fourfold.
4.3.2. Assessment of the minimum period
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness to control the spread of PPR of the
minimum periods during which the competent authority should apply the restriction measures in the
protection and surveillance zones. The length of the minimum period of duration of measures in
protection zone is 21 days, while for the surveillance zone is 30 days (Annex X of the Delegated
Regulation).
To assess the minimum length of time the protection and the surveillance zones should be kept in
place, the average (for the protection zones) and the longest (for the surveillance zones) period
between the earliest point of infection and the notification of a suspicion will be used (EFSA AHAW
Panel, 2020).
Table 7: Probability of transmission of PPRV beyond different distances, assuming the same
transmission kernels as for sheep and goat pox
Distance (km)
3 5 10 15 20 25 50
Estimate 0.096 0.054 0.023 0.014 0.010 0.007 0.003
Lower 95% CI 0.031 0.019 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.002
Upper 95% CI 0.258 0.145 0.055 0.028 0.017 0.011 0.003
Table 8: Distances (km) at which the probability of transmission of PPRV beyond that distance
reaches a threshold level, assuming the same transmission kernels as for sheep and goat
pox
Threshold probability of transmission
0.001 0.005 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5
Estimate 103.5 33.2 19.4 5.3 2.9 1.5 0.4
Lower 95% CI 88.2 20.0 9.8 1.8 0.9 0.4 0.1
Upper 95% CI 113.7 38.8 26.8 10.6 6.6 3.8 1.3
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Based on the results of the ELS as presented in the Table 4 in Section 4.2.1, it follows that the
average time between infection and notification of the suspicion is 21 days. This coincides with the
minimum period of 21 days indicated in the Delegated Regulation for the restriction measures in the
protection zone, therefore the latter is considered effective to detect infected establishments and to
prevent the movement of infected animals from the protection zone.
In addition, the maximum period between the earliest point of infection and the suspicion report
has been reconstructed as 33 days, by adding the maximum incubation period (10 days) to the
maximum period between first suspicion and suspicion report (23 days). Consequently, the minimum
period of 30 days indicated in the Delegated Regulation for the restriction measures in the surveillance
zone should be extended up to 33 days, so to detect infected establishments and to prevent the
movement of infected animals from the surveillance zone.
4.3.3. Uncertainty analysis
Although several sources of uncertainty were identified during the scientific assessment (see
Annex F), their impact on the outputs of the assessment could not be quantified.
Control measures for PPR
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ToR 1: In the event of suspicion or confirmation
1st scenario
4.1.1.1 In the event
of a suspicion of PPR
in an establishment
where animals of the
listed species are kept
No specific guidelines on
sampling procedures for
clinical or laboratory
examination in the event of
a suspicion of PPR are
available in the EU legislation
The suspicion of PPR is raised by detection of PPR-related clinical signs. The
confirmation of clinical suspicion is based on laboratory test, mainly by confirming the
presence of the virus nucleic acids (RT-PCR) or of antibodies (ELISA test). The collection
of specimens for RT-PCR testing can be performed either on dead or alive animals. In
the latter, samples should be collected in the acute phase of the disease, when clinical
signs are apparent, to maximize the probability of detecting the viral genome. If
samples are collected from dead animals, these should be few hours from death, since
the virus may rapidly inactivate.
In case of large numbers of animals showing clinical signs, at least five animals among
those showing fever and other signs typical of the acute phase of the disease should be
preferred for sampling. If clinical signs are not evident in the herd, the sampling of
randomly selected asymptomatic animals can be performed and ELISA should be also
performed.
Detection of antibodies for PPR confirmation in a PPR free country, with no vaccinated
animals, can complement the RT-PCR testing, taking into account that only from 10 to
14 days after the infection the antibodies are detectable by ELISA assays. The
confirmation based on serology alone requires the collection of two blood samples, three
weeks apart, from the same animals, which is not always feasible in the field.
Serological surveys are useful to determine the presence or absence of infection in a





enquiry as referred to
Article 57 of
Regulation (EU)2016/
429 in an PPR
officially confirmed
establishment
There are no sampling
procedures defined for the
purposes of the
epidemiological enquiry in an
establishment affected and
officially confirmed with PPR.
For PPR, it is not possible to derive or estimate the time of exposure by the lesions,
which are not disease-specific and may greatly vary. In addition, it is not possible to use
the laboratory results. Antibodies are detectable after 10–14 days from the infection and
they remain probably for the whole productive life of the animals. Consequently,
detection of antibodies suggests that infection occurred > 10 days prior to detection of
antibodies, but no other inferences can be made upon the time of exposure on the basis
of serological results. No commercial tests are available for the detection of IgM and
other more transient antibody classes.
3rd scenario
4.1.1.3. For granting
There are no sampling
procedures to grant a
Animals in an affected establishment and for which a specific derogation from killing has
been granted should be subjected to clinical and laboratory examination. Sampling
All the animals intended for
derogation from killing
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from killing animals of
the categories of
article 13.2 of the
Delegated Regulation
in an PPR affected
establishment
derogation from killing of
animals in an affected
establishment
procedures should ensure that the animals do not pose a risk of transmission if left
alive.
Animals of the holding that are negative for antibodies and virus do not pose a risk of
transmission of PPR. Recovered animals with antibody positive results only, do not pose
a risk of transmission.
General evaluation of the animal health status of the establishment should be carried
out, preferably every day, to detect early the onset of clinical signs, for a period of at
least the existing monitoring period of 21 days calculated forwards from the day of
confirmation of the latest case.
should be subjected to
thorough individual clinical
examination twice at two
weeks intervals to identify
those animals with clinical









There are no sampling
procedures defined for of
non-listed species kept in an
affected establishment by
PPR
The listed species for PPR according to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/
18823 are Ovis spp., Capra spp., Camelidae, Cervidae.
Where other susceptible domestic animals are also kept, these should also be sampled.
Those should be tested for both the presence of virus by PCR and/or viral isolation as
well as for serology. Although there is no evidence from literature or other reports (Fine
et al., 2020) suggesting that PPRV could naturally spread by intraspecies transmission
between pigs and wild boar, suids should be considered as possible source of infection
as suggested by experimental infections.
5th scenario
4.1.1.5. For wild





There are no sampling
procedures defined for wild
animals of the listed species
within the PPR affected
establishment and its
surroundings
In the scenario where wild cervids (e.g. roe deer, red deer, fallow deer) or wild bovids
(e.g. muflon, chamois, ibex, etc.) are kept or living in the surrounding area of the
affected establishment, these may acquire the infection by direct or indirect contact with
affected animals, if no or low biosecurity measures are in place to keep animal species
separated.
The surveillance of wildlife
around the affected
establishment should include
the visual inspection of these
animals from distance and
the testing of fallen stock
and hunted animals both by
PCR and serology.
Unexpected mortality events









There are no sampling
procedures defined for
animals of listed species in
the non-affected
establishments located in a
protection zone for PPR
All establishments located in the protection zone should be visited and the animals
should be subjected to clinical surveillance, including a laboratory examination to ensure
the detection of the virus, if the virus is present in these animals.
Active surveillance via serological or virological testing of randomly selected animals (i.e.
in the absence of clinical signs) should be conducted only if this could be considered
necessary due to epidemiological considerations such as spread of a low virulent strain
of the virus with none or very little clinical signs.
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a radius larger than 3
km








There are no sampling
procedures defined for
animals of listed species in
the non-affected
establishments located in a
protection zone for PPR
It is extremely unlikely (1–5%) that establishments in this zone, not epidemiologically
linked to an outbreak, will become infected with PPRV without having additional
outbreaks in the protection zone.
For the surveillance zone, it is recommended that the efforts will be allocated to
enhance passive surveillance by increasing awareness in all establishments, industry and
public. Any establishment where more generic signs of disease are reported, should be
visited, the animals should be clinically examined and samples should be collected (see
1st scenario for sample scheme).













No sampling procedures are
defined for PPR for this
scenario
Clinical examinations must be carried out in each subunit of the establishment in which
the kept listed species are to be moved following the procedures described in the
Section 4.1.1.1. If individual clinical examination of all the animals is not feasible, the
number of animals indicated by the sample size calculations as in Section 4.1.1.1 is to
be examined.
If animals are moved from the protection zone to a slaughterhouse outside the
restriction zones, clinical examination and sample collection for laboratory investigation
for should be performed as described in the Section 4.1.1.1.
In case of clinical suspicion,
the procedures described in








No sampling procedures are
defined for PPR for this
scenario
This scenario is similar to 9th scenario (Section 4.1.2.1) thus same conclusions are valid.
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No sampling procedures are
defined for PPR for this
scenario
This scenario is very similar to 9th scenario (Section 4.1.2.1); thus the same conclusions
are valid.
For animals intended to be moved from an establishment located outside the
surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone, there is no need
for laboratory examination, if there are no other reasons based on the national risk
assessment to recommended it (e.g. epidemiological link with affected establishment or
with affected or high-risk area). Only clinical examination as described above would be
enough.
To grant derogation for
animal movements from an
establishment in a
surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse located














No sampling procedures are
defined for PPR for this
scenario
Animals in a surveillance zone, for which a specific derogation has been granted to be
moved to pastures, should be subjected to clinical surveillance, including laboratory
examinations.
Sampling procedures for laboratory examination should ensure that the animals do not









located in or outside
the surveillance zone
No sampling procedures are
defined for PPR for this
scenario
Animals in a surveillance zone, for which a specific derogation has been granted to be
moved to an establishment in or outside the surveillance zone, should be subjected and
found negative to clinical examination, at least a sample with 95% confidence, including
laboratory examinations.
Sampling procedures should be implemented as described in Section 4.1.2.1.
In case of clinical suspicion, the procedures for the laboratory confirmation as in
Section 4.1.1.1 should be followed, and movement prohibited until confirmation of being
negative.
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poultry located in the
surveillance zone to
establishments
located in the same
MS
Not applicable.





in the restricted zone




beyond the period set
out in Annex XI of
the Delegated
Regulation
No sampling procedures are
defined for PPR for this
scenario.
Animals in the restricted zone, for which a specific derogation has been granted for
movement within the restricted zone, should be subjected to clinical examination; if they
are not immediately slaughtered, they should also be sampled for laboratory
examinations. Sampling procedures for laboratory examination should ensure that the
animals do not pose a risk of transmission with a confidence level of 95%.
ToR 1: For repopulation purposes
19th scenario
4.1.3.1 For the
animals that are kept
for the repopulation
No sampling procedures are
defined for PPR for this
scenario.
Animals intended for repopulation should be subjected to clinical examinations, if not all
at least a sample ensuring 95% confidence.
For animals that are introduced from disease-free areas outside the restricted zone,
sampling can be omitted because they have not been exposed to virus before entry
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and, consequently, can only produce a negative test result.
If animals are sourced from restricted areas, all the animals in the establishment of
origin should be sampled. Sampling procedures for laboratory examination should
ensure that the animals do not pose a risk of transmission at a confidence level of 95%.
20th scenario
4.1.3.2 In the event
of unusual mortalities
or clinical signs being
notified during the
repopulation.
No sampling procedures are
defined for PPR for this
scenario.
In the case of unusual mortalities or clinical signs compatible with PPR notified during
the repopulation, the establishment is considered suspected, the repopulation should be
stopped and the procedures for the laboratory confirmation as described in the





No sampling procedures are
defined for PPR for this
scenario.
The animals that have been used for the repopulation should be submitted to thorough
clinical and, if showing signs, laboratory examination in order to rule out the presence of
the disease.
Animals must be subjected to clinical inspection at least every three days for the first 14
days following the introduction, and weekly from 15 to at least 21 days (monitoring
period) after re-introduction. The last day of the monitoring period following the latest
day of animals’ introduction, all the animals (or at least a sample ensuring 95%
confidence) should be subjected to thorough clinical examination as described in
Section 4.1.1.1 and should be sampled for laboratory examination in accordance to the
procedures there.
In case of clinical suspicion, then the procedures for the laboratory confirmation that are




Assessment of the length of the
monitoring period of PPR
The length of the monitoring period of 21 days as defined in the Delegated Regulation is considered
effective for all scenarios mentioned in ToR 2, except for the first affected establishments detected in an
area, where a monitoring period of 33 days is recommended.
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 48 EFSA Journal 2021;19(7):6708
Control measures for PPR
ToR 3
Description Conclusions Recommendations
Section 4.3.1: Assessment of the
minimum radius
The estimated value of probability of transmission beyond the protection zone of 3 km radius (as
indicated in the Delegated Regulation) is 9.6% (95% CI: 3.1–25.8%) and 2.3% (95% CI: 1–5.5%) for 10
km radius (surveillance zone), which may be considered sufficient to contain the disease spread. The
95% probability of containing transmission would correspond to 5.3 km (95% CI: 1.8–10.6 km).
If the aim is to reduce the probability of transmission beyond the surveillance zone of 10 km to 1%, the
radius should be increased to 19 km (95% CI: 9.8–26.8). This, nonetheless, would on average increase
the number of farms in the surveillance zone (affected by movement restrictions) fourfold.
Section 4.3.2:
Assessment of the minimum period for
the restriction measures
The minimum period of 21 days indicated in the Delegated Regulation for the restriction measures in the
protection zone is considered effective to detect infected establishments and to prevent the movement of
infected animals from the protection zone. The minimum period of 30 days indicated in the Delegated
Regulation for the restriction measures in the surveillance zone should be extended up to 33 days, so to
detect infected establishments and to prevent the movement of infected animals from the surveillance
zone.
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Abbreviations
AGID agar gel diffusion
AHS African horse sickness
ASF African swine fever
bELISA blocking ELISA
C-ELISA competitive ELISA
CSF classical swine fever
CBPP contagious bovine pleuropneumonia
CCPP contagious caprine pleuropneumonia
CF complement fixation
DIVA Differentiating Infected from Vaccinated Animals
Dpi days post inoculation
d.p.in days after disease introduction
ELISA enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
ELS extensive literature search
FMD foot and mouth disease
FMDV foot and mouth disease virus
GF-TADS Global Framework for the progressive control of Transboundary Animal Diseases
H-ELISA haemagglutinin ELISA
HPAI highly pathogenic avian influenza
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indirect Ab ELISA indirect antibody ELISA
LFD lateral flow device
LSD lumpy skin disease virus
NCD Newcastle disease virus
OIE World Organization for Animal Health
PCR polymerase chain reaction




RT-LAMP reverse transcription-loop mediated isothermal amplification technique
RT-PCR reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction
RVFV Rift Valley fever virus
SN serum neutralisation
SGP sheep and goat pox
SPGP sheep pox and goat pox
SZ surveillance zone
ToR Terms of Reference
VNT virus neutralisation test
Control measures for PPR
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Annex A – Definitions in EU legislation
Terms Definitions
Clinical examination The clinical examination comprises: (i) an initial general evaluation of the animal health
status of the establishment which comprises all the animals of listed species kept in the
establishment; and (ii) an individual examination of the animals included in the sample
referred to in point (a). The sampling of animals for clinical examination is carried out in
accordance with point A.1 of Annex I for terrestrial animals (Delegated Regulation article 3)
Confined
establishment
Means any permanent, geographically limited establishment, created on a voluntary
basis and approved for the purpose of movements, where the animals are: (a) kept or
bred for the purposes of exhibitions, education, the conservation of species or research;
(b) confined and separated from the surrounding environment; and (c) subject to animal
health surveillance and biosecurity measures; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(48))
Epidemiological unit Means a group of animals with the same likelihood of exposure to a disease agent;
(AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(39))
Establishment Means any premises, structure, or, in the case of open-air farming, any environment or
place, where animals or germinal products are kept, on a temporary or permanent basis,
except for: (a) households where pet animals are kept; (b) veterinary practices or
clinics; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(27))
Health status Means the disease status as regards the listed diseases relevant for a particular listed
species with respect to: (a) an animal; (b) animals within: (i) an epidemiological unit; (ii)
an establishment; (iii) a zone; (iv) a compartment; (v) a Member State; (vi) a third
country or territory; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(34))
Infected zone Means a zone in which restrictions on the movements of kept and wild animals or
products and other disease control and biosecurity measures may be applied with the
view to preventing the spread of a category A disease in the event of official
confirmation of the disease in wild animals. (Delegated Regulation article 2(15))
Kept animals Means animals which are kept by humans, including, in the case of aquatic animals,
aquaculture animals; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(5))
Outbreak Means the officially confirmed occurrence of a listed disease or an emerging disease in
one or more animals in an establishment or other place where animals are kept or
located; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4 (40)
Protection zone Means a zone around and including the location of an outbreak, where disease control
measures are applied in order to prevent the spread of the disease from that zone;
(AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(42))
Listed diseases Means diseases listed in accordance with Article 5(1); (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article
4 (18))
List of the diseases (AHL: Regulation 2016/429, Annex II)
Listed species Means an animal species or group of animal species listed in accordance with Article 8
(2), or, in the case of emerging diseases, an animal species or group of animal species
which meets the criteria for listed species laid down in Article 8(2); (AHL: Regulation
2016/429 article 4(20))
List of species and groups of species (Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882)
Monitoring periods It is appropriate to follow a single approach for the measures to apply in the event of a
category A disease. However, the epidemiology of diseases should be taken into account
to establish the appropriate moment for the competent authority to apply control
measures and to carry out investigations if there is suspicion or confirmation of those
diseases. Therefore ‘monitoring periods’ should be provided, as reference time frames
for each category A disease affecting terrestrial animals based on incubation periods and
other relevant elements that may affect the spread of the disease. (Delegated
Regulation whereas 10).
Restricted zone Means a zone in which restrictions on the movements of certain animals or products and
other disease control measures are applied, with a view to preventing the spread of a
particular disease into areas where no restrictions are applied; a restricted zone may,
when relevant, include protection and surveillance zones; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429
article 4(41))
Surveillance zone Means a zone which is established around the protection zone, and where disease
control measures are applied in order to prevent the spread of the disease from the
protection zone; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(43))
Control measures for PPR
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Terms Definitions
Wild animals Means animals which are not kept animals; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(8))
Zone Means: (a) for terrestrial animals, an area of a Member State, third country or territory
with a precise geographical delimitation, containing an animal subpopulation with a
distinct health status with respect to a specific disease or specific diseases subject to
appropriate surveillance, disease control and biosecurity measures; (AHL: Regulation
2016/429 article 4 (35))
Control measures for PPR
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Annex B – Scenarios of ToR 1
ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenario
In the event of suspicion or confirmation
ToR 1.1
ToR 1.2
6(2) of the Delegated
Regulation
1st scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures of animals of
listed species in a suspected establishment,
based on clinical examination (ToR 1.1) and
laboratory examination (ToR 1.2), in their
ability to detect a category A disease in
kept animals if the disease is present in that
establishment, or to rule it out if not
present (Art. 6 (2)).
• event of suspicion of a category A disease
• in an establishment
• kept animals of listed species
• the competent authority shall immediately conduct an investigation
to confirm or rule out the presence of the suspected listed disease
• official veterinarians perform clinical examinations and collect
samples for laboratory examinations





2nd scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures, based on
laboratory examination (ToR 1.2), in their
ability to detect the disease in the event of
preventive killing, and in their ability to
support with the epidemiological
investigation (disease detection, prevalence
estimation, virus identification, etc.) in kept
animals of listed species in an affected
establishment, before or when they are
killed or found dead. The purposes of the
epidemiological enquiry are described in
Article 57 of Regulation (EU)2016/429.
• affected establishment officially confirmed
• kept animals of listed species found dead or before/when they are
killed
• competent authority collects samples for laboratory examination for
the purposes of:
a) supporting the epidemiological enquiry:
– to identify the likely origin of the disease
– to calculate the likely length of time that the disease is present
– to identify establishments where the animals could have
contracted the disease and movements from the affected
establishment that could have led to the spread of the
disease
– to obtain information on the likely spread of the listed
disease in the surrounding environment, including the
presence and distribution of disease vectors
b) confirming/ruling out disease in the event of preventive killing
ToR 1.1
ToR 1.2
Article 13(3)c of the
Delegated Regulation
3rd scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2)
examinations of the animals of listed
species belonging to the categories
described in article 13(2)) of an affected
establishment, in order to grant a specific
derogation from killing these animals, while
• affected establishment officially confirmed
• kept animals of listed species of specific categories
• animal categories based on article 13(2):
a) animals kept in a confined establishment
b) animals kept for scientific purposes or purposes related to
conservation of protected or endangered species
c) animals officially registered in advance as rare breeds
d) animals with a duly justified high genetic, cultural or educational
value
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ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenario
ensuring that they do not pose a risk for
the transmission of the disease.
• the competent authority may grant specific derogation from killing
all the animals of listed species belonging to any of the above
categories in an affected establishment, provided that specific
conditions are fulfilled
• the animals should be subjected to clinical surveillance, including
laboratory examinations
• sampling procedures should ensure that the animals do not pose a
risk of transmission of the category A disease if left alive
ToR 1.1
ToR 1.2
Article 14(1) of the
Delegated Regulation
Art. 57 Reg. 2016/429
4th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2)
examinations of the animals of non-listed
species kept in an affected establishment,
in their ability to ensure the detection of the
virus if the virus is present in these species.
• kept animals of non-listed species of epidemiological relevance for
the control of the disease
• animals of non-listed species are those animals that are not listed in
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 for each of
the category A diseases
• animal species acting purely as mechanical carriers of the virus will
not be covered
• The competent authority is not obliged to carry out the sampling of
non-listed species, but they may establish it in addition to other
measures




Article 14(1) of the
Delegated Regulation
Art. 57 Reg. 2016/429
5th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2)
examinations of the wild animals of listed
species within the affected establishment
and in its surroundings. The purpose of the
sampling procedures is to ensure the
detection of the virus, if the virus is present
in these wild species
• affected establishment officially confirmed
• wild animals of listed species within the establishment and in the
surroundings of the establishment
• the competent authority may establish these sampling procedures in
addition to other measures
• sampling procedures in wild animals of listed species to ensure the
detection of the virus, if the virus is present in these wild species
ToR 1.1
ToR 1.2
Article 26(2) of the
Delegated Regulation
6th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2)
examinations of the animals of listed
species in establishments located in the
protection zone. The purpose of the
sampling procedures is to ensure the
• protection zone with radius up to 3 km
• non-affected establishments with kept animals of listed species
• all the non-affected establishments within the protection zone
• official veterinarians must visit at least once all the establishments
• among others, they must perform a clinical examination of kept
animals of listed species and if necessary, collection of samples for
laboratory examination
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ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenario
detection of the virus, if the virus is present
in these animals.
• sampling procedures to confirm or rule out the presence of a
category A disease
ToR 1.3 Article 26(5) of the
Delegated Regulation
point A.3 of Annex I
7th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures, based on
clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2)
examinations of the animals of listed
species, for the sampling of establishments
located in a protection zone when the
radius is larger than 3 km. The purpose of
the sampling procedure is to ensure disease
detection of the virus if the virus is present
in establishments within the protection zone
• protection zone with radius larger than 3 km
• non-affected establishments of kept animals of listed species
• sample of the non-affected establishments in the protection zone
• in a protection zone with a radius equal to 3 km, official
veterinarians must carry inspections in all establishments within the
3 km
• In case of a radius larger than 3 km, official veterinarians may not
visit all establishments, but a sample of those. EFSA is requested to
assess how many of these establishments should be inspected, in
order to ensure the detection of the virus, if the virus is present in
animals in these establishments
• among others perform clinical examination of kept animals of listed
species and if necessary, collection of samples for laboratory
examination
• sampling procedure to ensure the detection of the disease if the
disease is present in any of these establishments
ToR 1.3 Article 41 of the
Delegated Regulation
8th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures, based on
clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2)
examinations of the animals of listed
species, for the sampling of the
establishments located within the
surveillance zone. The purpose of the
sampling procedure is to ensure disease
detection if the virus is present in
establishments within the surveillance zone
• surveillance zone
• establishments of kept animals of listed species
• sample of the establishments in the surveillance zone
• official veterinarians carry out visits to a sample of the
establishments
• among others perform clinical examination of kept animals of listed
species and if necessary, collection of samples for laboratory
examination
• sampling procedure to ensure the detection of the disease if the
disease is present in any of the establishments
Derogations to allow animal movements
ToR 1.4 Article 28(5) of the
Delegated Regulation
Article 29 of the
Delegated Regulation
9th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations of
the animals of an establishment in a
protection zone, in order to grant a
derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of animals, and allow for the
• protection zone
• kept animals of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from a non-affected establishment
in the protection zone
• to be moved to a slaughterhouse located within the protection zone
or in the surveillance zone or outside the restricted zone
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animals to be moved to a slaughterhouse
located within the protection zone or in the
surveillance zone or outside the restricted
zone (Art. 29)
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in
the establishment, including those animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 28(5) and
Article 30(1) of the
Delegated Regulation
10th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations, to
grant a derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of day-old-chicks located in the
protection zone and hatched from eggs
originating in the restricted zone or outside
the restricted zone. The sampling
procedures should ensure that the
movement of these day-old-chicks to an
establishment located in the same Member
State but if possible, outside the restricted
zone
• protection zone
• grant derogation for movement from a non-affected establishment
in the protection zone
• day-old-chicks from non-affected establishment located in the
protection zone, hatched from eggs originating in or outside the
restricted zone
• to be moved to an establishment located in the same Member State
but if possible, outside the restricted zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in
the establishment, including those animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 28(5) and
Article 30(2) of the
Delegated Regulation
11th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations, to
grant a derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of ready-to-lay poultry located in
the protection zone to establishments
located in the same MS and if possible
within the restricted zone.
• protection zone
• ready-to-lay poultry
• grant derogation for movement from a non-affected establishment
in the protection zone
• to be moved to an establishment located in the same Member State
and if possible, within the restricted zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in
the establishment, including those animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 28(5) and
Article 37 of the
Delegated Regulation
12th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations of
the animals of an establishment in a
protection zone, in order to grant
derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of these animals to a plant
approved for processing or disposal of
animal by-products in which the kept
animals are immediately killed (Art. 37)
• protection zone
• kept animals of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from a non-affected establishment
in the protection zone
• to be moved to a plant approved for processing or disposal of
animal by-products in which the kept animals are immediately killed
• clinical examinations and laboratory examinations of animals kept in
the establishment, including those animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 13th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
• surveillance zone
• kept animals of listed species
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ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenario
Article 43(5) and
Article 44 of the
Delegated Regulation
clinical and/or laboratory examinations of
the animals of listed species in order to
grant derogation from prohibitions and
allow for these animals to be moved: a)
from an establishment in a surveillance
zone to a slaughterhouse located within or
outside the restricted zone, b)from an
establishment outside the surveillance zone
to a slaughterhouse situated in the
surveillance zone
• grant derogation for movement from an establishment in the
surveillance zone to be moved to a slaughterhouse within the
restricted zone or outside the restricted zone
• grant derogation for movement from an establishment outside the
surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance
zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in
the establishment, including those animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 43(5) and
Article 45(1) of the
Delegated Regulation
14th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations of
kept ungulates of listed species in order to
grant a derogation and allow for the
animals to be moved from an establishment
in the surveillance zone to pastures situated
within the surveillance zone
• surveillance zone
• kept ungulates of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from an establishment in the
surveillance zone
• to be moved to pastures situated within the surveillance zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in
the establishment, including those animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 43(5) and
Article 45(2) of the
Delegated Regulation
15th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations of
kept ungulates of listed species in order to
grant derogation and allow to be moved
from an establishment in the surveillance
zone to an establishment belonging to the
same supply chain, located in or outside the
surveillance zone, in order to complete the
production cycle before slaughter
• surveillance zone
• kept animals of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from the surveillance zone
• to be moved to an establishment belonging to the same supply
chain, located in or outside the surveillance zone, to complete the
production cycle before slaughter
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in
the establishment, including those animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 43(5) and
Article 46(1) of the
Delegated Regulation
16th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations to
grant derogation of movements of day-old-
chicks hatched from establishment located
in the surveillance zone, from eggs
originating within the surveillance zone and
eggs originating outside the restricted zone,
to an establishment located in the same
Member State where they were hatched
• surveillance zone
• kept birds of listed species
• grant derogation for movement of day-old-chicks hatched from
establishment located in the surveillance zone, from eggs originating
from establishment within the surveillance zone or eggs originating
from outside the restricted zone
• to be moved to an establishment located in the same Member State
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in
the establishment, including those animals to be moved
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ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenario
ToR 1.4 Article 43(5) and
Article 46(2) of the
Delegated Regulation
17th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations, to
grant a derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of ready-to-lay poultry located in
the surveillance zone to establishments
located in the same MS.
• surveillance zone
• ready-to-lay poultry
• to be moved to an establishment located in the same Member State
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in
the establishment, including those animals to be moved
ToR 1.4 Article 56(1)c of the
Delegated Regulation
18th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations of
the animals of an establishment located in
the restricted zone of an outbreak in order
to allow their move within the restricted
zone, when restriction measures are
maintained beyond the period set out in
Annex XI
• restricted zone when restriction measures are maintained beyond
the period set out in Annex XI
• kept animals of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from an establishment within the
restricted zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in
the establishment, including those animals to be moved
Repopulation
ToR 1.5 Article 59(2),(3) of the
Delegated Regulation
19th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
laboratory examinations of the animals that
are kept for the repopulation prior to their
introduction to rule out the presence of the
disease.
• repopulation of a previous affected establishment
• kept animals of listed species
• Animals intended to repopulation shall be sampled prior to their
introduction into the establishment of destination
• samples shall be collected from a representative number of animals
to be introduced of each consignment from each establishment or
from a representative number of animals of each consignment (if
animals are all to be introduced at different times or from different
establishments of origin)
• laboratory examinations
• sampling procedures to rule out the presence of the disease
ToR 1.5 Article 59(9) of the
Delegated Regulation
20th scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
laboratory examinations of the animals that
have been repopulated, in the event of
unusual mortalities or clinical signs being
notified during the repopulation; to rule out
the presence of the disease.
• repopulated establishment
• unusual mortalities or clinical signs during the repopulation
• the official veterinarians shall without delay collect samples for
laboratory examination
• sampling procedures to rule out the presence of the disease
ToR 1.5 Article 59(5) of the
Delegated Regulation
21st scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
• repopulated establishment
• kept animals of listed species
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ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenario
laboratory examinations of the animals that
have been repopulated, on the last day of
the monitoring period calculated forward
from the date on which the animals were
placed in the repopulated establishment. In
case the repopulation takes place in several
days, the monitoring period will be
calculated forward from the last day in
which the last animal is introduced in the
establishment.
• Animals that have been used for repopulation
• Laboratory examinations
• Sampling procedures to rule out the presence of the disease
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Annex C – Sampling procedures for PPR
Sampling scenarios for PPR – Based on Council Directive 92/119/EEC if not stated otherwise
Scenario Description of the Scenario Clinical guidelines Laboratory guidelines
1st To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures of animals of listed
species in a suspected
establishment, based on
clinical examination (ToR 1.1)
and laboratory examination
(ToR 1.2), in their ability to
detect a category A disease in
kept animals if the disease is
present in that establishment,
or to rule it out if not present
(Art. 6 (2)).
Article 4:
1) When animals on a holding are suspected of
being infected or contaminated with PPR,
Member States shall ensure that the official
veterinarian immediately activates official
investigation arrangements to confirm or rule out
the presence of the disease in question
2) As soon as the suspected presence of the
disease is notified, the competent authority shall
have the holding placed under official surveillance
and shall in particular require that:
a) a census be made of all categories of animals
of susceptible species and that, in respect of
each of these categories, the number of animals
already dead, infected or liable to be infected or
contaminated be recorded; the census must be
kept up to date to take account of animals born
or dying during the period of suspicion; the
information in the census must be kept up to
date and produced on request and may be
checked at each visit;
b) all animals of susceptible species on the
holding be kept in their living quarters or
confined in some other place where they can be
isolated taking into account the possible role of
vectors, where appropriate;
c) no animals of susceptible species enter or
leave the holding;
d) all movement:
– of persons, animals of other species not
susceptible to the disease and vehicles to or from
the holding,
– of meat or animal carcasses, or of animal feed,
equipment, waste, droppings, litter, manure, or
anything liable to transmit the disease in question
Article 4:
1. When animals on a holding are suspected of being infected or
contaminated with PPR, Member States shall ensure that the official
veterinarian immediately activates official investigation arrangements to
confirm or rule out the presence of the disease in question and, in
particular, must take or have taken the samples necessary for
laboratory examination. To that end the animals in question may be
transported to the laboratories under the supervision of the competent
authority, which shall take appropriate steps to prevent the disease
from spreading.
EURL-PPR Sampling instructions in case of PPR suspicion
(CIRAD, 2017):
Samples to be collected and tests to be conducted in case of a
suspicion, according to the animal’s status:
– Alive with symptoms: Priority samples: Nasal/Ocular swabs; Optional
samples: Whole Blood for buffy coat Detect virus with qPCR
– Dead: Priority samples: Nasal/Ocular swabs, lymph node, lung;
Optional samples: Whole Blood for buffy coat Detect virus with qPCR
– Alive without symptoms: serum Detect antibodies with c-ELISA
OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial
Animals, heading ‘B. Diagnostic techniques’ (OIE, 2019b):
A tentative diagnosis can be made based on clinical signs, but is
considered provisional until laboratory confirmation is made for
differential diagnosis with other diseases with similar signs.
Samples to be taken for the diagnosis of PPR:
– Live animals: In live animals, swabs are made of the conjunctival
discharges or from the nasal, buccal or rectal mucosae. During the
very early stage of the disease, whole blood is also collected in
anticoagulant for virus isolation, PCR and haematology (either ethylene
diamine tetra-acetic acid or heparin can be used as anticoagulant,
though the former is preferred for samples that will be tested using
PCR). Samples for virus isolation must be kept chilled in transit to the
laboratory.
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e) be subject to authorization by the competent
authority, which shall lay down the conditions for
preventing any risk of the disease spreading;
appropriate means of disinfection be installed at
the entrances and exits of buildings or places
housing animals of susceptible species and of the
holding itself.
OIE Terrestrial Code (OIE, 2019a):
In the case of peracute cases the presenting sign
may be sudden death. In the case of sub-acute
(mild) cases, clinical signs are displayed
irregularly and are difficult to detect. All
significant epidemiological events consistent with
PPR, such as pneumo-enteritis syndrome, should
be reported and investigated immediately. Where
suspicion cannot be resolved by epidemiological
and clinical investigation, samples should be
taken and submitted to a laboratory.
Epidemiology and Control of Peste des
Petits Ruminants (ECo-PPR): Field research
manual (ILRI, 2020):
In case of a suspicion of PPR, an outbreak
investigation is conducted. The outbreak
investigation includes an interview with the
livestock keepers to gather epidemiological
information about the disease problem, followed
by a general examination of the flock and clinical
examination of sick animals.
Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan
(AUSVETPLAN): Response Strategy (Animal
Health Australia, 2020):
In suspected premises: daily physical surveillance
of sheep and goats will be required for a period
of 15 days, then weekly inspections for a further
2 weeks.
– At necropsy: samples from two to three animals should be collected
aseptically from lymph nodes, especially the mesenteric and bronchial
nodes, lungs, spleen and intestinal mucosae, Real-time RT-PCR assay is
the method of choice for laboratories that have the necessary
equipment.
It is good practice to collect blood for serological diagnosis at all
stages, but particularly later in the outbreak.
FAO Field Manual (FAO, 1999):
Always sample several animals in an outbreak. The samples required
are tears, gum debris. For post-mortem: mediastinal and mesenteric
lymph nodes, portions of spleen and lungs. Two sets of each tissue are
required. Unclotted blood for virus isolation should be collected in
bottles containing anticoagulants. Clotted blood or serum for antibody
detection.
Epidemiology and Control of Peste des Petits Ruminants (ECo-
PPR): Field research manual (ILRI, 2020):
In case of a suspicion of PPR, an outbreak investigation is conducted.
If the disease problem is judged to fit the case definition for PPR-like
disease then samples are collected from 1 to 5 animals for PPRV rapid
diagnostic test and for submission to the laboratory for PCR and
sequencing. The best animals to test are those that have been sick for
1–3 days with a raised temperate (≥ 40.0C) and early signs of PPR
disease; ocular and/or nasal discharge, with or without mouth lesions,
coughing, sneezing and diarrhoea. If there are any recently dead
sheep or goats (within 24 h) then a post mortem examination can also
be carried out and tissue samples collected for laboratory submission.
If you get a positive animal, then collect a full set of samples from the
positive animal and from 2 to 3 other animals with early PPR clinical
signs for laboratory testing (eye and nose swabs, and a plain blood
sample for serum). If all the rapid diagnostic tests are negative, but
the clinical signs and epidemiological information are strongly
suspicious of PPR disease, then collect samples from six animals with
early clinical signs for laboratory analysis.
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Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN):
Response Strategy (Animal Health Australia, 2020):
Laboratory confirmation of PPR in Australia would be based on real-
time reverse transcriptase PCR with sequencing, and virus isolation in
selected cases.
Emergency animal diseases: A field guide for Australian
veterinarians; Chapter 3.17. Peste des petits ruminants (Breed
et al., 2019):
Collect samples from clinically affected animals, ideally during the
pyrexic stage, before the onset of diarrhoea. Alternatively, collect
samples from animals that have recently died, or immediately after
euthanised for post-mortem.
Samples to collect for diagnostic testing are:
• serum, from at least 10 animals (if possible) towards the end of the
acute phase or from recovered animals.
• EDTA blood, from live, clinically affected animals (7–10 mL/animal)
during the acute phase (preferably from pyrexic animals).
• fresh tissue, including lymph node (especially the mesenteric and
bronchial nodes), lungs, spleen, tonsils, tongue, affected areas of the
alimentary tract (2 g of each tissue).
• fixed tissue, comprising a full range of tissues including lungs,
intestine, spleen, mesenteric lymph nodes, liver and kidneys (in 10%
neutral-buffered formalin)
• swabs, of conjunctival discharge as well as nasal, buccal and rectal
mucosa. Collect from live, clinically affected animals (early during the
acute phase) and preferably from pyrexic animals.
The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan
(FAD PReP)—Disease Response Strategy (USDA-APHIS,
2013):
When PPR is suspected, laboratory diagnostic testing will be performed
at the National Veterinary Services Laboratories, Foreign Animal
Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (NVSL FADDL) at Plum Island, NY.
Confirmatory tests include histopathology, polymerase chain reaction
(PCR), virus isolation (VI), and virus neutralization (VN).
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1.2), in their ability to detect
the disease in the event of
preventive killing, and in their




identification, etc.) in kept
animals of listed species in an
affected establishment, before
or when they are killed or
found dead. The purposes of
the epidemiological enquiry
are described in Article 57 of
Regulation (EU)2016/429.
NA
Note: Australian Veterinary Emergency
Plan (AUSVETPLAN): Response Strategy
(Animal Health Australia, 2020):
In infected premises: daily physical surveillance
of sheep and goats will be required for a period
of 15 days, then weekly inspections for a further
2 weeks.
No specific guidelines described in legislation
Article 8:
1) The epizootiological enquiry shall deal with:
a) the length of time during which the disease may have existed on the
holding before being notified or suspected;
b) the possible origin of the disease on the holding and the
identification of other holdings on which there are animals of
susceptible species which may have become infected or contaminated;
c) the movement of persons, animals, carcasses, vehicles, equipment
or any other substances likely to have carried the agent of the disease
to or from the holdings in question;
2) A crisis unit shall be established in order to provide full coordination
of all measures necessary to ensure eradication of the disease as
quickly as possible and for the purpose of carrying out the
epizootiological enquiry.
3rd To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures based on clinical
(ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR
1.2) examinations of the
animals of listed species
belonging to the categories
described in article 13(2)) of
an affected establishment, in
order to grant a specific
derogation from killing these
animals, while ensuring that
they do not pose a risk for the
transmission of the disease.
NA
Article 5:
1) Once it has been officially confirmed that PPR
is present on a holding, Member States shall
ensure that, in addition to the measures laid
down in Article 4 (2), the competent authority
requires application of the following measures:
a) all animals of susceptible species on the
holding shall be killed on the spot, without delay.
The animals which have died or been killed shall
either be burnt or buried on the spot, if possible,
or destroyed in a carcase disposal plant. These
operations shall be carried out in such a way as
to minimize the risk of disseminating the agent
of the disease.
NA
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4th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures, based on clinical
(ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR
1.2) examinations of the
animals of non-listed species
kept in an affected
establishment, in their ability
to ensure the detection of the
virus if the virus is present in
these species.
No specific guidelines described in legislation No specific guidelines described in legislation
Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN):
Response Strategy (Animal Health Australia, 2020):
Tracing and surveillance will be used to determine the distribution of
the disease and the disease-free areas.
Ruminants (especially cattle) not for slaughter will be identified for
possible later serological testing.
Note: Subclinical infection, with subsequent antibody production, has
been reported in cattle by natural and experimental infection, but cattle
do not transmit PPR virus. Pigs can be subclinically infected with PPR
but they do not transmit the virus. They are not considered to be
important in the epidemiology of PPR (Nawathe DR and Taylor WP
(1979). Experimental infection of domestic pigs with the virus of peste
des petits ruminants. Tropical Animal Health and Production 11:120–
122.).
5th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures, based on clinical
(ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR
1.2) examinations of the wild
animals of listed species
within the affected
establishment and in its
surroundings. The purpose of
the sampling procedures is to
ensure the detection of the
virus, if the virus is present in
these wild species.
No specific guidelines described in legislation
Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan
(AUSVETPLAN): Response Strategy (Animal
Health Australia, 2020):
Tracing and surveillance will be used to
determine the distribution of the disease and the
disease-free areas. Feral goats and camels will
need to be surveyed if they are present in the
vicinity of the IP(s) and may have had contact
with domestic sheep and goats.
It is unlikely that wild deer will become infected
or play any part in the spread of PPR. However,
as PPR has occurred in deer overseas, some
clinical or serological surveillance of any deer in
the area may need to be undertaken. If signs are
found, wild deer in the immediate area will be
controlled.
Note: Red deer, Cervus elaphus, have been
infected in a natural outbreak. White-tailed deer,
Odocoileus virginianus, are susceptible to
experimental infection and may develop lesions
No specific guidelines described in legislation
Note: Eradication of Peste des Petits Ruminants virus and the
wildlife-livestock interface (Fine et al., 2020)
Diagnostic tools for PPRV detection, primarily developed for livestock
species, have not been standardized and adequately validated for
wildlife. Clear guidelines and standards for application and
interpretation of PPR diagnostic tests in wildlife species need to be
established. There is a need to improve wildlife health surveillance
systems and systematically conduct thorough wildlife disease outbreak
investigations, in particular at the wildlife-livestock interface.
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similar to those seen in sheep and goats. Some
deer may become subclinically infected with virus
and show no visible signs (Hamby FM and Dardiri
AH (1976). Response of white-tailed deer to
infection with peste des petits ruminants virus.
J Wildlife Diseases 12:516–522.).
Note: The Foreign Animal Disease
Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD
PReP)—Disease Response Strategy (USDA-
APHIS, 2013):
Wild animals may become exposed or contribute
to the transmission of the disease to domestic
animals either as biological or mechanical
vectors. Wildlife management and vector control
involves identifying susceptible wild-life species,
determining how many species may be infected,
and preventing the spread by implementing
control measures. In the event of a PPR outbreak
in domestic sheep and/or goats, APHIS VS will
work in close collaboration and coordination with
other agencies, entities, and units that have
primary jurisdiction over wildlife.
6th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures based on clinical
(ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR
1.2) examinations of the
animals of listed species in
establishments located in the
protection zone. The purpose
of the sampling procedures is
to ensure the detection of the
virus, if the virus is present in
these animals.
Article 11:
1) Member States shall ensure that the following
measures are applied in the protection zone:
a) all holdings within the zone having animals of
susceptible species shall be identified;
b) there shall be periodic visits to holdings having
animals of susceptible species, a clinical
examination of those animals; a record of visits
and findings must be kept, with the frequency of
visits being proportional to the seriousness of the
epizootic on those holdings at greatest risk
No specific guidelines described in legislation
Article 11:
1) Member States shall ensure that the following measures are applied
in the protection zone:
a) all holdings within the zone having animals of susceptible species
shall be identified;
b) there shall be periodic visits to holdings having animals of
susceptible species, a clinical examination of those animals including, if
necessary, the collection of samples for laboratory examination; a
record of visits and findings must be kept, with the frequency of visits
being proportional to the seriousness of the epizootic on those holdings
at greatest risk.
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7th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures, based on clinical
(ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR
1.2) examinations of the
animals of listed species, for
the sampling of
establishments located in a
protection zone when the
radius is larger than 3 km. The
purpose of the sampling
procedure is to ensure disease
detection of the virus if the




1) Once the diagnosis of one of the diseases in
question has been officially confirmed, Member
States shall ensure that the competent authority
establishes around the infected holding a
protection zone with a minimum radius of three
kilometres, itself contained in a surveillance zone
with a minimum radius of 10 kilometres. The
establishment of the zones must take account of
geographical, administrative, ecological and
epizootiological factors relating to the disease in
question, and of monitoring facilities.
→ See 6th scenario
→ See 6th scenario
8th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures, based on clinical
(ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR
1.2) examinations of the
animals of listed species, for
the sampling of the
establishments located within
the surveillance zone. The
purpose of the sampling
procedure is to ensure disease
detection if the virus is
present in establishments
within the surveillance zone.
No specific guidelines described in legislation
Article 12:
1) Member States shall ensure that the following
measures are applied in the surveillance zone:
a) all holdings having animals of susceptible
species shall be identified;
b) the movement of animals of susceptible
species on public roads shall be prohibited except
for the purpose of leading them to pasture or
animal buildings; the competent authority may,
however, grant a derogation from that prohibition
for the transit of animals by road or rail without
unloading or stopping;
c) the transport of animals of susceptible species
within the surveillance zone shall be subject to
authorization by the competent authority;
d) animals of susceptible species must remain
inside the surveillance zone for a maximum
incubation period after the most recent recorded
case of disease.
No specific guidelines described in legislation
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Derogations to allow animal movements
9th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures based on clinical
and/or laboratory
examinations of the animals
of an establishment in a
protection zone, in order to
grant a derogation from
prohibitions in the movement
of animals, and allow for the
animals to be moved to a
slaughterhouse located within
the protection zone or in the
surveillance zone or outside
the restricted zone (Art. 29).
Article 11:
1. Member States shall ensure that the following
measures are applied in the protection zone:
d) animals of susceptible species must remain on
the holding on which they are being kept, except
to be transported under official supervision
directly to a slaughterhouse located in that zone
for emergency slaughter or, if that zone has no
slaughterhouse under veterinary supervision, to a
slaughterhouse in the surveillance zone
designated by the competent authority. Such
transport may be authorized by the competent
authority only after the official veterinarian has
carried out an examination of all the animals of
susceptible species on the holding and confirmed
that none of the animals is suspected of being
infected. The competent authority responsible for
the slaughterhouse shall be informed of the
intention to send animals to it.
No specific guidelines described in legislation
10th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures based on clinical
and/or laboratory
examinations, to grant a
derogation from prohibitions
in the movement of day-old-
chicks located in the
protection zone and hatched
from eggs originating in the
restricted zone or outside the
restricted zone. The sampling
procedures should ensure that
the movement of these day-
old-chicks to an establishment
located in the same Member
NA NA
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State but if possible, outside
the restricted zone.
11th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures based on clinical
and/or laboratory
examinations, to grant a
derogation from prohibitions
in the movement of ready-to-
lay poultry located in the
protection zone, to
establishments located in the
same Member State and if
possible within the restricted
zone.
NA NA
12th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures based on clinical
and/or laboratory
examinations of the animals
of an establishment in a
protection zone, in order to
grant derogation from
prohibitions in the movement
of these animals to a plant
approved for processing or
disposal of animal by-products
in which the kept animals are
immediately killed (Art. 37).
No specific guidelines described in legislation No specific guidelines described in legislation
13th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures based on clinical
and/or laboratory
examinations of the animals
of listed species in order to
grant derogation from
prohibitions and allow for
these animals to be moved:
Article 12:
1) Member States shall ensure that the following
measures are applied in the surveillance zone:
(d) animals of susceptible species must remain
inside the surveillance zone for a maximum
incubation period after the most recent recorded
case of disease. Thereafter, animals may be
removed from that zone to be transported under
No specific guidelines described in legislation
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a) from an establishment in a
surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse located within
or outside the restricted zone,
b) from an establishment
outside the surveillance zone
to a slaughterhouse situated
in the surveillance zone.
official supervision directly to a slaughterhouse
designated by the competent authority for
emergency slaughter. Such transport may be
authorized by the competent authority only after
the official veterinarian has carried out an
examination of all the animals of the susceptible
species on the holding and confirmed that none
of the animals is suspected of being infected. The
competent authority responsible for the
slaughterhouse shall be informed of the intention
to send animals to it.
14th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures based on clinical
and/or laboratory
examinations of kept
ungulates of listed species in
order to grant a derogation
and allow for the animals to
be moved from an
establishment in the





1. Member States shall ensure that the following
measures are applied in the surveillance zone:
b) the movement of animals of susceptible
species on public roads shall be prohibited except
for the purpose of leading them to pasture or
animal buildings.
NA
15th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures based on clinical
and/or laboratory
examinations of kept
ungulates of listed species in
order to grant derogation and
allow for them to be moved
from an establishment in the
surveillance zone to an
establishment belonging to
the same supply chain,
located in or outside the
surveillance zone, in order to
NA
Article 12:
1) Member States shall ensure that the following
measures are applied in the surveillance zone:
b) the movement of animals of susceptible
species on public roads shall be prohibited except
for the purpose of leading them to pasture or
animal buildings.
NA
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complete the production cycle
before slaughter.
16th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures based on clinical
and/or laboratory
examinations to grant
derogation of movements of
day-old-chicks hatched from
establishment located in the
surveillance zone, from eggs
originating within the
surveillance zone and eggs
originating outside the
restricted zone, to an
establishment located in the
same Member State where
they were hatched.
NA NA
17th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures based on clinical
and/or laboratory
examinations, to grant a
derogation from prohibitions
in the movement of ready-to-
lay poultry located in the
surveillance zone to
establishments located in the
same Member State.
NA NA
18th To assess the effectiveness of
disease-specific sampling
procedures based on clinical
and/or laboratory
examinations of the animals
of an establishment located in
the restricted zone of an
outbreak in order to allow
their move within the
Article 13:
Where the prohibitions provided for in Articles 11
(1) (d) and 12 (1) (d) are maintained beyond 30
days because of the occurrence of further cases
of the disease and as a result problems arise in
keeping the animals, the competent authority
may, following an application by the owner
explaining the rounds for such application, by the
No specific guidelines described in legislation
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restricted zone, when
restriction measures are
maintained beyond the period
set out in Annex XI.
owner explaining the grounds for such
applications authorize the removal of the animals
from a holding within the protection zone or the
surveillance zone, provided that:
a) the official veterinarian has verified the facts;
b) an inspection of all animals on the holding has
been carried out;
c) the animals to be transported have undergone
a clinical examination, with negative result;
d) each animal has been marked by ear marking
or has been identified by any other approved
method;
e) the holding of destination is located either in
the protection zone or within the surveillance
zone.
Repopulation




the animals that are kept for
the repopulation prior to their
introduction to rule out the
presence of the disease.
NA No specific guidelines described in legislation




the animals that have been
repopulated, in the event of
unusual mortalities or clinical
signs being notified during the
repopulation; to rule out the
presence of the disease.
NA No specific guidelines described in legislation




NA No specific guidelines described in legislation
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the animals that have been
repopulated, on the last day of
the monitoring period
calculated forward from the
date on which the animals
were placed in the
repopulated establishment. In
case the repopulation takes
place in several days, the
monitoring period will be
calculated forward from the
last day in which the last
animal is introduced in the
establishment.
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ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenarios
ToR 2 Article 8 of the Delegated
Regulation
Article 57 of 2016/429
Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
1st scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of
the Monitoring Period, as the time period
calculated backwards from the date of the
notification of the suspicion of a category A
disease in an establishment with kept
animals of listed species, for the purposes
of the epidemiological enquiry in the event
of a suspicion.
• event of suspicion of a category A disease
• in an establishment with kept animals of listed species
• time period calculated backwards from the date of the of the
notification of the suspicion
• time period before the suspicion, during which the pathogenic
agent may have been introduced in the establishment and
may have spread outside the establishment
• the aim of the epidemiological enquire is:
a) identify the likely origin of the listed disease in question
and the means of its spread
b) calculate the likely length of time that the listed disease
has been present
c) identify establishments and epidemiological units therein,
food and feed businesses or animal by–products
establishments, or other locations, where animals of
listed species for the suspected listed disease may have
become infected, infested or contaminated
d) obtain information on the movements of kept animals,
persons, products, vehicles, any material or other means
by which the disease agent could have been spread
during the relevant period preceding the notification of
the suspicion or confirmation of the listed disease
e) obtain information on the likely spread of the listed
disease in the surrounding environment, including the
presence and distribution of disease vectors
ToR 2 Article 17(2) and Article 57
of 2016/429 Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
2nd scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of
the Monitoring Period, as the time period
calculated backwards from the date of
notification of the suspicion of a category A
disease in an establishment with kept
animals of listed species, for the purposes
of the epidemiological enquiry in the event
of confirmation of the disease.
• event of confirmation of a category A disease
• in an establishment with kept animals of listed species
• time period calculated backwards from the date of the
notification of the suspicion
• time period before the suspicion, during which the pathogenic
agent was introduced in the establishment and during which it
could have spread outside the establishment.
• The aim of the epidemiological enquire is the same as above.
ToR 2 Article 13(b) of the
Delegated Regulation
3rd scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of
the Monitoring Period, as the time period
• event of confirmation of a category A disease
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Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
calculated backwards from the date of
confirmation of a category A disease in an
establishment with kept animals of listed
species, during which the epidemiological
units in which the disease has not been
confirmed were kept completely separated
and handled by different personnel, in order
to provide derogations from killing.
• in an affected establishment with kept animals of listed
species
• non-affected epidemiological units kept separated
• to provide derogation from killing for animals in non-affected
separated epidemiological units
• to exclude any possible contact between the affected
establishment and the separated epidemiological units as per
the epidemiological enquiry
• time period calculated backwards from the date of the
confirmation
• time period before the confirmation, during which the
pathogenic agent may have been introduced in the separated
non-affected epidemiological units of the affected
establishment.
ToR 2 Article 27(3)c of the
Delegated Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
4th scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of
the Monitoring Period, as the time period
calculated backwards from the date of
notification of the suspicion of the latest
outbreak of a category A disease in the
protection zone. Products or other materials
likely to spread the disease, must had been
obtained or produced, before this time




• Products or other materials likely to spread the disease,
obtained or produced, before the start of the monitoring
period of the affected establishment that originated the
protection zone
• time period calculated backwards from the date of suspicion
of the latest outbreak in the protection zone
• time period before the notification of the suspicion, during
which the products and materials produced in the non-
affected establishments of a protection zone may have been
contaminated by the pathogenic agent of the disease.
ToR 2 Article 32(c) of the
Delegated Regulation
Article 48(c) of the
Delegated Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
5th scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of
the Monitoring Period, as the time period
calculated forwards from the date of semen
collection from animals of listed species
kept in approved germinal product
establishments in the protection or in the
surveillance zone, to prove that the donor
animal has tested favourable on a sample
taken not earlier than 7 days after the
monitoring period.
• protection or surveillance zone
• non-affected approved germinal establishments
• semen from kept animals (donor) of listed species
• semen collected after the estimated date of the earliest
infection of the earliest affected establishment that originated
the protection zone/surveillance zone (if belonging to more
than one protection or surveillance zones)
• to take samples from the donor for laboratory analysis at least
7 days after the end of the monitoring period
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• to authorise movements of semen from approved germinal
product establishments located in the protection or
surveillance zones in case of favourable laboratory results
• time period calculated forwards from the date of semen
collection
• time period after the semen collection, during which the
animal donor if infected could be detected by the relevant
diagnostic test.
ToR 2 Article 57(1)b of the
Delegated Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
6th scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of
the Monitoring Period, as the appropriate
time period calculated forwards from the
date after the final cleaning and disinfection
and when relevant control of insects and
rodents was carried out in an affected
establishment, after which the repopulation
of the establishment may be allowed by the
competent authority.
• repopulation of a previous affected establishment
• kept animals of listed species
• to allow the repopulation of an affected establishment
• time period calculated forwards from the date of the final
cleaning and disinfection of the establishment
• time period to ensure that the repopulation exercise is not put
at risk due to the disease being unknowingly present in an
establishment in the surrounding area.
ToR 2 Article 59(4)b of the
Delegated Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
7th scenario To assess the effectiveness of the length of
the Monitoring Period, as the appropriate
time period calculated forwards the date
when the first animal was introduced,
during which all the animals of listed
species intended for repopulation should be
introduced.
• repopulation of a previous affected establishment
• kept animals of listed species to be repopulated
• the animals may not be introduced at the same time
• time period calculated forwards from the date when the first
animal was introduced
• time period during which animals intended for repopulation,
should be introduced and the process of repopulation be
completed.
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duration of measures in
the protection zone







Minimum period of duration of
measures in the surveillance zone
(as referred to in Articles 55 and 56
of this Regulation) Annex XI
Foot and mouth disease
(FMD)
3 km 10 km 15 days 15 days 30 days
Infection with rinderpest virus
(RP)
3 km 10 km 21 days 9 days 30 days
Infection with Rift Valley fever
virus (RVFV)
20 km 50 km 30 days 15 days 45 days
Infection with lumpy skin
disease virus (LSD)
20 km 50 km 28 days 17 days 45 days
Infection with Mycoplasma
mycoides subsp. mycoides SC
(Contagious bovine
pleuropneumonia) (CBPP)
Establishment 3 km 45 days Not applicable 45 days
Sheep pox and goat pox
(SPGP)
3 km 10 km 21 days 9 days 30 days
Infection with peste des petits
ruminant virus (PPR)
3 km 10 km 21 days 9 days 30 days
Contagious caprine
pleuropneumonia (CCPP)
Establishment 3 km 45 days Not applicable 45 days
African horse sickness (AHS) 100 km 150 km 12 months Not applicable 12 months
Infection with Burkholderia
mallei (Glanders)
Establishment Establishment 6 months Not applicable Not applicable
Classical swine fever (CSF) 3 km 10 km 15 days 15 days 30 days
African swine fever (ASF) 3 km 10 km 15 days 15 days 30 days
Highly pathogenic avian
influenza (HPAI)
3 km 10 km 21 day 9 days 30 days
Infection with Newcastle
disease virus (NCD)
3 km 10 km 21 days 9 days 30 days
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 79 EFSA Journal 2021;19(7):6708
Control measures for PPR
Annex F – Uncertainty
Source or location of
the uncertainty
# Nature or cause of uncertainty as described by the experts
Impact of the uncertainty on the
assessment
ToR 1 1 Parameters governing transmission dynamics and mortality rates in the model used for
answering scenarios under ToR 1 are based on a limited number of studies (several on
experimental challenges).
There is a great variability of morbidity and mortality rates due to different hosts (animal
breeds, husbandry conditions,) and virus factors (mainly virulence). This affects the
precision of any estimation.
The effectiveness of the sampling strategies
could be over or underestimated
2 Disease transmission is assumed to follow the same dynamics in sheep and goat flocks
although evidences suggest a higher virulence/pathogenicity of PPRV in goat flocks.
The effectiveness of the sampling strategies
could be over or underestimated
3 Diagnostic tests are assumed to have 100% Sensitivity and Specificity. Although this is a
reasonable assumption given the evidence retrieved there may be instances in which test
performance may not be perfect (particularly with regards to serological tests).
The effectiveness of the sampling strategies
could be overestimated
ToR 2 4 Very few references available to estimate the time from infection to suspicion, and no data
obtained from EU
The effectiveness of the proposed strategy
could be over or underestimated
5 In order to use references providing periods between first suspicion and report of suspicion,
the incubation period was assumed to be 7 days (between 3 and 10).
The effectiveness of the proposed strategy
could be over or underestimated
6 References used to estimate the time between infection and seroconversion are based on
experimental inoculation of PPRV (instead of natural infection), what may not mimic the
situation in naturally infected animals (particularly with lower infectious doses)
The effectiveness of the proposed strategy
could be over or underestimated
ToR 3 7 No transmission kernels are available for PPR. Transmission kernels for sheep and goat pox
were used as a proxy. Although the causative agents of both viruses share certain features
they also have different characteristics that may impact transmission and thus kernel
estimates may not be directly applicable for modelling risk of PPRV transmission.
The effectiveness of the proposed zone size
could be underestimated
8 SGP kernels were fitted only on data from a single region in Greece and thus may not be
representative of transmission in different epidemiological situation
The effectiveness of the proposed zone size
could be over or underestimated
8
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Annex G – Literature search for seroconversion period of PPR
Methodology
For the assessment of scenario 5 of the 2nd ToR, the methodology described in Section 2.3 of the
Technical Report published by EFSA (https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.2903/sp.efsa.
2020.EN-1988) and in scientific opinion for PPR was followed.
Framework of methodology
Framework to meet the objectives is depicted in Table 1.
Framework of methodology.
Years From 2000 onwards
Comments/Explanation: This will depend on the availability of the bibliographic databases
Language Only studies written in English will be reviewed
Comments/Explanation:
Publication type Only primary research studies will be reviewed
Comments/Explanation:
• Reviews (i.e. secondary research studies) will not be included in the review, but they
reference lists will be screened as sources of studies
• Book chapters, theses and unpublished data will not be included
• Letters and editorials will be excluded as normally these do not include any primary
research studies
• Patents will be excluded
• No geographical limits
Population Ovis ssp., Capra ssp., Camelidae, Cervidae
Comments/Explanation:
Intervention Serological diagnostic tests for PPR
Comments/Explanation:
Target PPR virus (family Paramyxoviridae, genus Morbillivirus) will be the targeted pathogens
Comments/Explanation:
Information sources




Due to the specificity of the objective and time constrains only clinical trials and randomised
controlled trials were included. Moreover, recent Oie diagnostic manual and relevant previous EFSA
scientific opinions were also included. Book chapters, theses and informally reported or unpublished
data were not collated.
Search strategy
The following search strategy was followed:
• Population: goat* or sheep or ovi* or capr* or “small ruminants” or cattle or camel* or Cervidae
• Serological Tests: “diagnostic test” or serolog* or antibod* or “immune diffusion” or *ELISA
• Target: “Peste des petits ruminants” or PPRV or Paramyxoviridae or Morbillivirus or “small
ruminant pest” or “pest of small ruminants “ or pest*
A scoping search identified:
• 834 papers in PubMed, and
• 1.562 papers in Mendeley
A database of the electronic search results was created with Mendeley software. Duplicate citations
were deleted automatically or manually when appropriated (n = 350).
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Study selection
Study selection was based on the following predefined inclusion criteria (questions):
1) Is the paper in English? Yes Unclear No
2) Is the paper an original clinical trial
or a randomized controlled trial for
the targeted listed species? Yes Unclear No
3) Is the paper describing a serological
diagnostic test for PPR? Yes Unclear No
4) Is the paper describing the earliest
day of seroconversion and the latest
day of antibodies detection after infection Yes Unclear No
Final decision: Include Review Exclude
All papers with a ‘no’ or ‘unclear’ for any question were excluded based on title/abstract.
All papers with a ‘yes’ for each question were reviewed based on title/abstract.
Screening of titles and abstracts after the application of the above inclusion criteria was conducted
for 172 papers.
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Annex H – Method for kernel estimation
This appendix presents full details of the modelling approach used to estimate kernels for the
spread of sheep and goat pox between farms.
Epidemiological data
The location and time of destruction for reported outbreaks of sheep and goat pox from the
epidemic in the Evros region of Greece between 2013 and 2015 were extracted from ADNS. Because
times of infection are not observed, farms were assumed to become infected (and infectious) 30 days
prior to destruction (the sensitivity of the estimates to this assumption was assessed; see Table H.1).
Modelling approach
The spread of sheep and goat pox was modelled at the farm level. Transmission between farms
was modelled using a kernel-based approach. In this case, the force of infection, ki(t), for farm i on
day t is given by,




where hB is the background transmission rate (e.g. due to introductions of SPGP from outside Greece,
unobserved infected farms or unexpectedly long distance animal movements), hK is the kernel
transmission rate (i.e. due to known infected farms), Ni is the number of small ruminants (sheep and
goats) on farm i, K(dij) is the transmission kernel (see below), dij is the great circle distance between
farms i and j, and Ij(t) is a variable indicating whether farm j is infectious (1) or not (0) on day t.
Four functional forms were considered for the kernel (Table H.1), which differ in their shape and
the rate at which they decay to zero. In each kernel the parameter d0 is the distance scaling and in
the alternative fat-tailed kernel a controls how rapidly the kernel decays with distance.
Parameter estimation
Parameters in the model were estimated using maximum likelihood methods. Because locations are
available only for affected farms, we used a conditional likelihood for the data (Szmaragd et al., 2009).




exp Ptinf1t¼t0 ki tð Þ
 
 1 exp ki tinfð Þð Þð ÞPtend
s¼t0 exp 
Ps1
t¼t0 ki tð Þ
 
 1 exp ki sð Þð Þð Þ
;
where ki(t) is the force of infection defined above tinf is the time at which the farm became infected, t0
is the time at the start of the epidemic and tend is the time at the end of the epidemic.
Selection of the best-fit kernel was based on the Akaike information criterion,
AIC ¼ 2 log Lmax þ 2k;
where Lmax is the maximum likelihood and k is the number of parameters in the model. The model
with the smallest AIC is preferred. Confidence intervals for the kernel parameters (d0 and a) were
computed using the profile likelihood.
The sensitivity of the best-fit kernel and the kernel estimates to assumptions about the duration of
a within-farm outbreak was assessed by fitting each of the four kernels assuming four outbreak
durations (15, 30, 60 or 90 days). For each assumed outbreak duration, the best-fitting kernel was the
alternative fat-tailed, followed by the fat-tailed, exponential and Gaussian (Table H.1). In addition, the
kernel estimates did not differ greatly in each case (Table H.1). Finally, the lowest AICs were obtained
when the assumed outbreak duration was 30 days. Kernel estimates from this analysis (i.e. 30 days)
where used to assess the minimum size of the protection and surveillance zones.
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Table H.1: Transmission kernels for sheep and goat pox and the impact of assumed outbreak
duration on kernel selection and estimates
Kernel Function
Outbreak duration
15 days 30 days 60 days 90 days
Fat-tailed
k(d) ¼ 1þ d
d0









k(d) ¼ exp  d
d0









k(d) ¼ exp  d
d0









k(d) ¼ 1þ d
d0
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Annex I – Performance of diagnostic test for PPR
The summary results from the literature review performed by DACRHA on performance of
diagnostic test for PPR are presented in Table I.1.
















ELISA, Blocking ELISA (B-ELISA)
Goat (Capra
aegagrus hircus)
1 90,4 90,4 90,4 98,9 98,9 98,9
ELISA, Competitive ELISA (C-ELISA)
CATTLE - Cattle
(Bos taurus)
2 93,4 93,4 93,4 98,5 98,5 98,5
Goat (Capra
aegagrus hircus)
14 93,47 68,65 100 98,06 93,53 100
Sheep (Ovis
aries)
6 96,7 93,4 100 99,25 98,5 100
Enzyme linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)
Goat (Capra
aegagrus hircus)
16 91,2 78 100 100 100 100
Sheep (Ovis
aries)




6 86,62 79,16 100 95,77 83,76 100
Sheep (Ovis
aries)




4 76,5 75 78 100 100 100
Sheep (Ovis
aries)
7 97,67 97,67 97,67 99,47 99,47 99,47
loop-mediated isothermal amplification (LAMP)
Goat (Capra
aegagrus hircus)
23 100 100 100 100 100 100
Real time Loop-mediated isothermal amplification (RT-LAMP)
Goat (Capra
aegagrus hircus)
2 100 100 100 88,2 88,2 88,2
Sheep (Ovis
aries)
2 100 100 100 100 100 100
Real-time PCR (qualitative or quantitative)
Goat (Capra
aegagrus hircus)
23 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sheep (Ovis
aries)




66 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sheep (Ovis
aries)




1 88,9 88,9 88,9 92,8 92,8 92,8
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1 100 100 100 100 100 100
Virus neutralisation test (VNT)
CATTLE - Cattle
(Bos taurus)
2 100 100 100 100 100 100
Goat (Capra
aegagrus hircus)
6 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sheep (Ovis
aries)
2 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Annex J – Protocol of literature review for length of monitoring period
Rationale
The EFSA has been requested to provide scientific opinions to support the European Commission
(EC) in the production of amending and implementing acts related to Regulation 2016/429 (the ‘Animal
Health Law’ (AHL)) which lays down rules for the prevention and control of transmissible animal
diseases. One of these scientific opinions will consist in assessing the effectiveness of several control
measures for Category A (listed) diseases such as the length of the monitoring periods set out in
Annex II of the Delegated Regulation (Mandate ToRs 2) and the duration of the control measures in
restricted zones set out in Annex X-XI for each category A disease of terrestrial animals (ToR 3b).
As part of this, EFSA has asked P95 (within FWC OC/EFSA/ALPHA/2020/02 LOT 2) to carry out an
extensive literature review (ELR) on the epidemiological parameter ‘time for an outbreak to be
reported’ for the following diseases: PPR, classical swine fever (CSF), Newcastle Disease (ND), sheep
pox and goat pox (SPGP), Rift Valley Fever (RVF), Glanders, contagious caprine pleuropneumoniae
(CCPP), contagious bovine pleuropneumoniae (CBPP) and Rinderpest.
The current protocol describes the methodology that will be used by P95 to conduct the ELR.
Review question
The specific objective of this review will be to answer the epidemiological question of: ‘what is the
average, shortest and longest period of time (measured as the number of days from the earliest point
of infection with the agent, to the time of reporting of a suspicion by the competent authority after the
clinical investigation by an official veterinarian) for an outbreak of each of the 9 diseases of concern to
be reported’.
Criteria for including studies
Starting with the objectives of the review stated above, the study inclusion criteria are based on
the PICOS strategy:
Population Domestic animal species
Intervention PPR, CSF, ND, SPGP, RVF, Glanders, CCPP, CBPP, Rinderpest
Comparison Not applicable
Outcome • Number of days between the earliest point of infection and the suspicion report
• Number of days between the earliest point of infection and the first suspicion
(1)
• Number of days between the earliest point of infection and the confirmation report
• Number of days between the first suspicion and the suspicion report
• Number of days between the first suspicion and the confirmation report
• Number of days between the suspicion report and the confirmation report
Study design Outbreak investigation, case report, surveillance data, modelling studies
(1): The suspicion based on the first observed clinical signs.
Exclusion criteria
1) The references will be excluded from the ELR if they meet one or more of following criteria:
2) References in another language than English, Spanish, German, Dutch, Portuguese and
French.
3) Review papers. However, original studies included in the review papers complying with the
inclusion/exclusion criteria will be included.
4) References published before 01/01/2000.
5) References pertaining exclusively to diagnostics/vaccine development, entomology,
in vitro/vivo studies.
6) References where the earliest point of infection is determined only by subtracting a known
incubation period from the date of the suspicion of the outbreak. However, after discussion
with EFSA and comment from experts, outbreaks investigations that do not determine the
true date of infection but report about the time between the onset of clinical signs and date
of suspicion of the disease could be included.
7) References presenting simulation exercises. However, if none or very few articles are
retrieved (less or equal to 5) in the first search, these studies may be included but their data
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should be presented in a separate table in the report together with a description of the
methodology.
8) References from outside the EU/EEA countries. However, If none or very few articles are
retrieved (less or equal to 5) in the first search, the search should be extended to the rest of
the world.
9) References related to outbreaks that took place in a slaughterhouse. Nonetheless, references
referring to outbreaks that occurred elsewhere, and are detected in a slaughterhouse may be
included if all other conditions for inclusion are met.
Information sources
Electronic databases
We will conduct a literature search in MEDLINE (via PubMed) and EMBASE to obtain peer-reviewed,
scientific publications related to the ELR.
Reference checking and hand searching
The reference list of relevant studies retrieved from the electronic database search will be hand
searched to identify additional studies.
Grey literature selection
Data in the public domain pertaining to the objective of this study, outbreak investigation reports or
surveillance data will be obtained via PAFF, OIE, EFSA, FAO, EuFMD websites, Google scholar, and
websites of EU veterinary reference laboratories for to the nine investigated diseases as well as
websites of national veterinary/animal health institutes, reference veterinary laboratories or ministry of
livestock from EU countries that previously experienced outbreaks of any of the five investigated
diseases.
Search strategy
The following search strategy will be used in Pubmed:
# Search string # of results
1 (((((((((((((((((((“first infection”[All Fields] OR “index case”[All Fields]) OR
(“introduction”[All Fields] OR “introductions”[All Fields])) OR “source of infection”[All
Fields]) OR “clinical signs”[All Fields]) OR “clinical symptoms”[All Fields]) OR “case
studies”[All Fields]) OR (“suspicion”[All Fields] OR “suspicions”[All Fields])) OR
(((“suspect”[All Fields] OR “suspected”[All Fields]) OR “suspecting”[All Fields]) OR
“suspects”[All Fields])) OR ((((((“confirm”[All Fields] OR “confirmation”[All Fields]) OR
“confirmations”[All Fields]) OR “confirmative”[All Fields]) OR “confirmed”[All Fields]) OR
“confirming”[All Fields]) OR “confirms”[All Fields])) OR ((((((“confirm”[All Fields] OR
“confirmation”[All Fields]) OR “confirmations”[All Fields]) OR “confirmative”[All Fields]) OR
“confirmed”[All Fields]) OR “confirming”[All Fields]) OR “confirms”[All Fields])) OR
((((((((“reportable”[All Fields] OR “reporting”[All Fields]) OR “reportings”[All Fields]) OR
“research report”[MeSH Terms]) OR (“research”[All Fields] AND “report”[All Fields])) OR
“research report”[All Fields]) OR “report”[All Fields]) OR “reported”[All Fields]) OR
“reports”[All Fields])) OR ((((((((“reportable”[All Fields] OR “reporting”[All Fields]) OR
“reportings”[All Fields]) OR “research report”[MeSH Terms]) OR (“research”[All Fields] AND
“report”[All Fields])) OR “research report”[All Fields]) OR “report”[All Fields]) OR
“reported”[All Fields]) OR “reports”[All Fields])) OR ((((((((“reportable”[All Fields] OR
“reporting”[All Fields]) OR “reportings”[All Fields]) OR “research report”[MeSH Terms]) OR
(“research”[All Fields] AND “report”[All Fields])) OR “research report”[All Fields]) OR
“report”[All Fields]) OR “reported”[All Fields]) OR “reports”[All Fields])) OR
(“notification”[All Fields] OR “notifications”[All Fields])) OR ((((((“notifiable”[All Fields] OR
“notified”[All Fields]) OR “notifier”[All Fields]) OR “notifiers”[All Fields]) OR “notifies”[All
Fields]) OR “notify”[All Fields]) OR “notifying”[All Fields])) OR ((((((“declaration”[All Fields]
OR “declaration s”[All Fields]) OR “declarations”[All Fields]) OR “declare”[All Fields]) OR
“declared”[All Fields]) OR “declares”[All Fields]) OR “declaring”[All Fields])) OR
((((((“declaration”[All Fields] OR “declaration s”[All Fields]) OR “declarations”[All Fields])
OR “declare”[All Fields]) OR “declared”[All Fields]) OR “declares”[All Fields]) OR
“declaring”[All Fields])) OR (((((((((((“detect”[All Fields] OR “detectabilities”[All Fields]) OR
“detectability”[All Fields]) OR “detectable”[All Fields]) OR “detectables”[All Fields]) OR
11,433,545
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# Search string # of results
“detectably”[All Fields]) OR “detected”[All Fields]) OR “detectible”[All Fields]) OR
“detecting”[All Fields]) OR “detection”[All Fields]) OR “detections”[All Fields]) OR
“detects”[All Fields])) OR ((((“trace”[All Fields] OR “traced”[All Fields]) OR “traces”[All
Fields]) OR “tracing”[All Fields]) OR “tracings”[All Fields])) OR (((((((((((“investigated”[All
Fields] OR “investigates”[All Fields]) OR “investigating”[All Fields]) OR “investigation”[All
Fields]) OR “investigations”[All Fields]) OR “investigative”[All Fields]) OR “investigator s”[All
Fields]) OR “research personnel”[MeSH Terms]) OR (“research”[All Fields] AND
“personnel”[All Fields])) OR “research personnel”[All Fields]) OR “investigator”[All Fields])
OR “investigators”[All Fields])
2 #1 AND
“time”[MeSH Terms] OR “time”[All Fields] OR “delay”[All Fields] OR “delayed”[All Fields] OR
“delaying”[All Fields] OR “delays”[All Fields] OR “length”[All Fields] OR “lengths”[All Fields]
OR “period”[All Fields] OR “periodic”[All Fields] OR “periodical”[All Fields] OR
“periodically”[All Fields] OR “periodicals”[All Fields] OR “periodicity”[MeSH Terms] OR
“periodicity”[All Fields] OR “periodicities”[All Fields] OR “periods”[All Fields] OR “duration”[All
Fields] OR “durations”[All Fields] OR “days”[All Fields] OR “date”[All Fields] OR “timelier”[All
Fields] OR “timeliness”[All Fields] OR “timelier”[All Fields] OR “timeliness”[All Fields] OR
“timely”[All Fields] OR “timing”[All Fields] OR “timings”[All Fields]
3,497,425
3a #2 AND
(“peste des petits ruminants”)








Filters: from 2000 to 2021
821
3d #2 AND
(“sheep pox and goat pox”)




















Filters: from 2000 to 2021
66
Review methods
Selection of the studies
The list of studies identified from the different databases will be appended into a single file using
Endnote and de-duplicated. The resulting list will be exported to Rayyan5 to proceed with the title,
abstract and key words screening and study selection.
To decrease the risk of selection bias, two P95 reviewers will independently review the list of
references obtained by screening key words in title/abstract to identify studies that fulfil the above-
5 https://rayyan.qcri.org
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mentioned selection criteria. Discrepancies will be discussed, and if not resolved, a third reviewer will
take the final decision.
All identified reviews and studies conducted outside EU/EEA will be classified in specific folders for
subsequent use.
Data extraction
In the second phase, full papers will be assessed for eligibility by a single reviewer. Data from the
eligible full-text papers identified will be extracted by two reviewers using a standardised extraction
form in MS Excel (see Annex) to ensure that all relevant data are collected systematically. In addition,
the section of the pdf manuscript from where data will be collected will be noted and/or highlighted.
The complete selection process will be documented in an Endnote file, containing folders that
reflect the selection criteria.
Analysis and reporting
During the selection process, the results of the literature search will be imported into Endnote
where a clear track of the selection process will be maintained, and the flow of publications will be
noted. Based on these numbers, a flowchart of the studies selected in accordance with the PRISMA
guidelines will be prepared for use in the subsequent reports.
If needed, extracted dates of interest will be combined together in order to calculate the periods of
interest. Extracted data on age of the lesions can also be used to estimate the earliest point of




















Using the data collected, a qualitative data synthesis of results will be performed for each specific
disease and parameter in terms of average, shortest and longest period of time. The different findings
will be synthesised using tables providing sufficient details on the methodology used in the references.
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Annex K – Estimated prediction intervals for the time to determined PPR
prevalence levels and for prevalence at given times post introduction
Table K.2: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the time (days post
introduction) to five sheep or goats dying of PPR
Scenario
Herd size
50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low mortality Low transmission 48 30 68 44 31 58 41 29 54 40 27 57
High transmission 38 25 53 33 24 46 30 23 39 31 22 46
High mortality Low transmission 25 18 48 27 16 38 26 16 40 25 17 38
High transmission 21 15 30 22 16 32 21 14 26 20 14 33
Table K.1: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the time (days post
introduction) to five sheep or goats with clinical signs of PPR
Scenario
Herd size
50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low mortality Low transmission 27 16 44 24 13 44 26 16 40 25 16 49
High transmission 20 13 32 20 13 30 19 13 27 19 12 32
High mortality Low transmission 18 12 42 19 11 39 18 10 32 18 10 36
High transmission 14 8 26 14 9 29 14 9 21 13 8 28
Table K.3: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the time (days post




50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low mortality Low transmission 12 6 33 18 10 32 32 23 47 37 27 59
High transmission 10 5 19 14 8 24 23 17 32 27 20 42
High mortality Low transmission 10 6 30 17 9 34 29 21 44 33 24 52
High transmission 8 4 21 12 8 27 21 16 29 24 19 39
Table K.4: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the time (days post




50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low mortality Low transmission 19 11 36 24 15 41 39 29 53 43 34 65
High transmission 14 9 24 19 12 28 27 21 36 32 25 46
High mortality Low transmission 15 10 34 22 15 43 34 26 50 39 29 57
High transmission 12 8 22 16 11 33 24 20 34 28 22 43
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Table K.6: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the time (days post




50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low mortality Low transmission 19 12 34 23 15 39 38 29 53 43 33 64
High transmission 14 9 24 18 13 27 28 21 35 31 25 46
High mortality Low transmission 16 11 32 22 15 41 34 26 49 39 29 57
High transmission 12 8 22 16 12 33 24 20 34 28 22 43
Table K.5: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the time (days post




50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low mortality Low transmission 12 6 25 18 10 31 31 23 47 36 27 58
High transmission 10 5 19 14 8 25 23 17 32 27 21 42
High mortality Low transmission 10 6 25 18 11 30 29 21 43 33 24 52
High transmission 8 4 20 13 9 27 21 16 29 24 19 39
Table K.7: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the infection




50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low mortality Low transmission 2.0 2.0 6 1.0 0.0 4.0 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.4
High transmission 4.0 2.0 10 2.0 1.0 5.0 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.5
High mortality Low transmission 2.0 0.0 8 1.0 0.0 4.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.4
High transmission 4.0 0.0 10 2.0 0.0 5.0 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.5
Table K.8: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the infection




50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low mortality Low transmission 6.0 0.0 20.0 3.0 0.0 9.1 0.6 0.0 1.6 0.3 0.0 1.0
High transmission 10.2 2.0 26.5 6.0 1.0 13.4 1.1 0.0 3.4 0.6 0.0 1.7
High
mortality
Low transmission 8.2 0.0 20.8 4.0 0.0 9.3 0.7 0.0 2.0 0.3 0.0 1.4
High transmission 14.6 0.0 40.4 6.2 0.0 18.6 1.4 0.0 3.4 0.9 0.0 2.4
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Table K.10: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the infection




50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low
mortality
Low transmission 24.7 0.0 59.6 14.0 0.0 41.7 3.0 0.0 9.1 1.6 0.0 5.6
High transmission 56.7 0.0 84.8 42.3 9.2 73.2 10.8 0.0 27.4 6.2 0.0 17.0
High
mortality
Low transmission 28.9 0.0 66.7 18.1 0.0 46.5 4.0 0.0 13.8 2.3 0.0 8.8
High transmission 70.5 0.0 90.9 55.1 0.0 83.8 18.3 0.0 41.2 11.5 0.0 29.8
Table K.9: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the infection




50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low
mortality
Low transmission 13.3 0.0 37 7 0.0 21.2 1.2 0.0 3.6 0.8 0.0 2.6
High transmission 30.6 0.0 63.3 16 2.0 41.2 3.6 0.0 10.0 1.9 0.0 5.6
High
mortality
Low transmission 15.1 0.0 50 8.2 0.0 24.5 1.6 0.0 5.8 0.9 0.0 3.2
High transmission 38.1 0.0 79.5 22.7 0.0 53.9 5.3 0.0 12.7 3.1 0.0 8.8
Table K.11: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the seroprevalence
(%) of peste des petits ruminants virus in sheep and goats at 7 days post introduction
Scenario
Herd size
50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low mortality Low transmission 1.9 1.9 5.8 1.0 0.0 3.9 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.4
High transmission 3.9 1.9 9.7 1.9 1.0 4.8 0.4 0.0 1.0. 0.2 0.0 0.5
High mortality Low transmission 2.0 0.0 7.8 1.0 0.0 3.9 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.4
High transmission 3.9 0.0 9.7 1.9 0.0 4.8 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.5
Table K.12: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the seroprevalence




50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low mortality Low transmission 5.9 1.9 19.4 2.9 0.0 8.8 0.6 0.0 1.6 0.3 0.0 1.0
High transmission 9.9 1.9 25.7 5.8 1.0 13.0 1.2 0.0 3.3 0.6 0.0 1.7
High
mortality
Low transmission 7.9 0.0 20.2 3.9 0.0 9.0 0.8 0.0 2.1 0.3 0.0 1.4
High transmission 14.1 0.0 39.2 6.4 0.0 18.0 1.4 0.0 3.4 0.8 0.0 2.3
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Table K.13: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the seroprevalence




50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low
mortality
Low transmission 13.6 2.0 36.4 7.8 0.0 21 1.4 0.0 3.5 0.8 0.0 2.5
High transmission 31.7 0.0. 64 16.5 1.9 40.3 3.8 0.0 10.1 1.9 0.0 5.5
High
mortality
Low transmission 14.8 0.0 52.7 8.8 0.0 25.9 1.6 0.0 5.9 0.9 0.0 3.2
High transmission 37.9 0 79.4 22.9 0 54.9 5.2 0.0 12.5 3.1 0 8.9
Table K.14: Median (M), lower (L) and upper (U) 95% prediction intervals for the seroprevalence




50 100 500 1,000
M L U M L U M L U M L U
Low
mortality
Low transmission 28.3 2.0 65.5 15.7 0.0 43.5 3.3 0.0 9.8 1.7 0.0 5.8
High transmission 63.6 0.0 91.4 43.1 9.9 77.6 10.9 0.0 28.0 6.3 0.0 16.9
High
mortality
Low transmission 30.1 0.0 73 19.4 0.0 47.4 4.1 0.0 13.7 2.4 0.0 9.0
High transmission 72.8 0.0 97.3 56.6 0.0 91.8 18.2 0.0 41.0 11.5 0.0 29.6
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